Halos, Billboards, and the Taxation of
Charitable Sponsorships
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Act now, act now, and receive as our gift, our gift to you
They come in all colors, one size fits all
No muss, no fuss, no spills, you’re tired of kitchen drudgery
Everything must go, going out of business, going out of business
Going out of business sale
Fifty percent off original retail price, skip the middle man
Don’t settle for less.1
[S]upport for WSUI comes from Kentucky Fried Chicken, near the corner
of Highway 1 West and Riverside Drive in Iowa City, joining others in
support of WSUI and KSUI public radio. KFC of Iowa City: family owned
since 1960.2
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INTRODUCTION
One fine day in 1991, a small band of idealistic IRS auditors and regulators set out
to defend the public fisc, the integrity of the tax system, competitive markets, and the
soul of the American nonprofit sector by taxing the sponsorship revenues of college
football and the Atlanta Olympics. Arrayed against the IRS were the combined
lobbying forces of college football, the Atlanta Olympics, the American Heart
Association, public broadcasting, and thousands of America’s favorite institutions.
Guess who won.
This is the standard story of the sponsorship battles in the early 1990s that ended
with the exemption of charities’3 commercial sponsorship income from the “unrelated
business income tax” (UBIT) that might otherwise apply.4 In this story, cynical
charities, corrupted by corporate advertising money, deployed unprincipled political
muscle to overwhelm the integrity of the tax system and sully American philanthropy
with unchecked commercialism. Like many conventional stories, this one contains
substantial truth. Frequent repetition, however, hides unanswered questions.
At the center of the controversy was the characterization of payments businesses
make to charities on condition of public recognition. Charities characterized these

3. This article uses “charity” as shorthand for organizations exempt from federal income
taxation under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Some of the rules I discuss also apply to other exempt
organizations, but the controversy over sponsorships revolved around organizations exempt
under Section 501(c)(3). It is important to emphasize that I intend the word to include all of the
activities that we implicitly choose to subsidize with the tax exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3),
although many people would not include all of these activities in their colloquial understanding
of the word “charity.” For further discussion of this disconnect between the extent of Section
501(c)(3) and colloquial understandings of “charity,” see infra note 6. All references in this
article to sections of the “Code” and the “I.R.C.” refer to sections of Title 26 of the United
States Code (2006), and all references in this article to sections of the “Regulations” or “Treas.
Reg.” refer to sections of Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
4. See, e.g., Frances R. Hill, Corporate Sponsorship in Transactional Perspective:
General Principles and Special Cases in the Law of Tax Exempt Organizations, 13 U. MIAMI
ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 5 (1995); Nancy J. Knauer, How Charitable Organizations Influence
Federal Tax Policy: “Rent-Seeking” Charities or Virtuous Politicians?, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 971,
1021–31 (1996) [hereinafter Knauer, Influence]; Lee A. Sheppard, The Goldberg Variations,
or: Giving Away the Store, 58 TAX NOTES 530 (1993); Nathan Wirtschafter, Note and Comment,
Fourth Quarter Choke: How the IRS Blew the Corporate Sponsorship Game, 27 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1465 (1994).
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payments as charitable donations (exempt from tax) for which the donor was simply
thanked publicly. The IRS attacked them as barely disguised ad buys, resulting in
taxable business income.
Underlying these claims, as well as the legislation that ended the controversy, was
an unexamined assumption that there was an important distinction between providing a
charitable donor with public recognition and providing a business with advertising
services. This assumption was so deeply ingrained that it tempted the IRS into two
losing battles and also held the charities back from total victory.
In this article, I examine this assumption critically for the first time, seeking not
only to explain what happened in the 1990s, but also to use it to explain the political
dynamics of the charitable exemption and the odd tax that protects it. I draw on several
decades of academic marketing literature that all sides of the debate have hitherto
ignored, to elucidate the conceptual distinction between selling sponsorships and
selling advertising—between leasing halos and billboards.
This distinction is the key to understanding the sponsorship controversy, the
legislation that ended it, and the instability of that solution. The distinction is important
because advertising and sponsor acknowledgement, although both forms of commercial
communication, have opposite symbolic meanings in the context of the exemption.
Advertising is the kind of uncharitylike activity the UBIT is designed to deter. Sponsor
acknowledgement, by contrast, is premised on creating a perception of genuine support
for the sponsored event or organization. In the symbolic politics of the exemption, this
perception of genuine support is a good substitute for the real thing. Any attempt to
deter it with the UBIT, no matter how well-grounded in preexisting doctrine, was
destined to political failure. Viewed in light of the distinction between advertising and
sponsor acknowledgement, the IRS did not start in the right, nor did it cravenly
abandon its post. Rather, it made an early mistake and quickly reconceptualized the
problem.
This reconceptualization lead to a practical problem: while the conceptual
distinction between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement is clear, it is not a
practical way to sort real arrangements, all of which contain a mix of both. The end
result had to be a legislative rule that would avoid this ambiguity. At the charities’
urging, Congress passed a rule that retained only a symbolic tax on advertising. As I
will discuss below, this was a politically unstable choice. I discuss the outlines of a
more stable safe-harbor rule.
First, a caution. Most writing about the charitable exemption has a strong normative
quality. People feel strongly about charities. Those strong feelings are what prompt
many authors to write. They want to support institutions they love, to tear the cloak of
saintliness from unworthy pretenders, or simply to suggest reforms that might bring the
reality of charity closer to authors’ high ideals.
I share these emotions and sympathize with the normative goals they inspire. But
that is not my project here. I have tried to write not from my emotional perceptions of
charities but about those perceptions and their influence on the politics and law of the
charitable tax exemption. This is crucial to understanding the charitable tax exemption
because, as I have demonstrated elsewhere, the exemption does not reflect instrumental
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legislative policy.5 The exemption is not a deliberate or even an intuitive attempt to
achieve some economic or social goal, such as a horizontally fair tax system or an
optimal level of public goods. Rather, it is chiefly an exercise in symbolic politics—a
mechanism for expressing and perpetuating cultural perceptions about charities. My
project in this article is to describe the possibly unstable place of sponsorship and
advertising in this political mechanism. Accordingly, I do not praise or condemn the
end result of that mechanism—the broad tax subsidization of charities. For the same
reasons, I also do not address whether the exemption covers a broader set of
organizations than it should.6 Both of these topics are worthy of thought, but they are
simply not the issue here.

5. See Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the History and Political
Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 EMORY L.J. 1475, 1480–81 (2005). For
further discussion, see infra text accompanying note 19.
6. Many observers’ discomfort in the 1990s may also have reflected an underlying
unhappiness with the scope of the exemption. Many of the critics of the college bowls and the
1993 Regulations seem to have been motivated to a significant degree by a feeling that popular
sports events were outside the realm of “good works” properly subsidized by the exemption.
See, e.g., Cynthia G. Farbman, Forced to Be a Fan: An Analysis and History of the IRS’s
Proposed Regulations Regarding Corporate Sponsorship, 2 SPORTS L.J. 53, 53 (1995)
(“College football has become increasingly commercialized. It is seldom played for the Olympic
ideal that sports should be played by amateur athletes for the sheer love of the game. Some
athletes might be playing for the love of the game, but it is likely that the schools’ motives are
less altruistic.”) (internal quotations omitted); Amy Forsythe, Implications of the Cotton Bowl
Ruling on the Exempt Status of Intercollegiate Athletic Organizations, 6 EXEMPT ORG. TAX
REV. 933, 933 (1992) (proposing the IRS challenge exempt status of bowl organizations rather
than challenging sponsorship revenues under UBIT); Paul Streckfus, Editor’s Notebook, 9
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 161, 162 (1994) (placing quotation marks around “charities” in
referring to the Mobil Cotton Bowl Athletic Association and other college bowl game
organizations); Wirtschafter, supra note 4, at 1510 (“Ultimately, however, big-time college
sports should be classified as for-profit activities.”). Questions of the appropriate limits of the
exemption are beyond the scope of this article. For an examination of the UBIT’s role in
suppressing such questions, see Stone, supra note 5. It should be noted that, although the
commercialism of college sports has grown over the years, its current political resolution is as
old as the UBIT itself. See H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, at 37 (1950) (specifying exemption of
college sports revenues as “related” business income). Recently, this political resolution has
come under question. On October 2, 2006, William Thomas, then chair of the House Ways and
Means Committee, sent a letter to Myles Brand, President of the National College Athletic
Association (NCAA). Thomas Requests Information on Tax Exemption, College Sports, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Oct. 5, 2006, LEXIS, 2006 TNT 193-23. The letter presents a number of specific
questions purportedly seeking to determine “whether major intercollegiate athletics further the
exempt purpose of the NCAA and, more generally, educational institutions.” Id. Thomas states
that “[c]orporate sponsorships, multimillion dollar television deals, highly paid coaches with no
academic duties, and the dedication of inordinate amounts of time by athletes to training lead
many to believe that major college football and men’s basketball more closely resemble
professional sports than amateur sports.” Id. He then asks the NCAA to report on the effects of
I.R.C. § 513(i), which, as discussed below, assured the tax-exempt status of college sport
sponsorships. Id. For a discussion of I.R.C. § 513(i) and the history of its passage, see infra
notes 21–60 and accompanying text. There have been other recent media calls for change. See,
e.g., Daniel Golden, Tax Breaks for Skyboxes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2006, at B1; George Will,
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Part I introduces the current taxation of advertising and sponsorship and describes
the controversy over sponsorship revenue. Part II discusses the distinction between
advertising and sponsor acknowledgement. This Part also discusses how that
distinction differs from the distinction between gratuitous and commercial transactions,
and why it is important to the political symbolism of the charitable exemption and the
UBIT. Part III uses the distinction set forth in Part II to reexamine the sponsorship
controversy of the 1990s and its eventual legislative solution. Part IV considers the
political stability of this solution and discusses alternatives.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Charitable Tax Exemption
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code7 (“Code”) exempts certain
“charitable” organizations from the federal income tax. The Code imposes two
principal requirements for exemption—nonprofit form and exempt purpose.8 The first
constraint is that the exempt organization must be organized in nonprofit form, such
that its earnings cannot inure to private benefit.9 The second requirement for exemption
is that the organization must be organized and operated exclusively for a statutorily
defined exempt purpose.10
Time to Rethink the Place of High-Stakes Football in Higher Education?, JEWISH WORLD REV.,
Oct. 24, 2006, available at http://jewishworldreview.com/cols/will102406.php3. Brand’s
response to Thomas’s letter extols the educational virtues of college athletics and gives factual
answers to Thomas’s questions where unavoidable. The crux of his answer, however, comes in
response to Thomas’s question, asking whether federal taxpayers should pay for high-profile
sports teams that colleges justify as giving themselves an advantage in competing for student
applicants. Thomas notes that “[f]ederal taxpayers have no interest in increasing applicant pools
at one school opposed to another.” Id. Brand responds that “while federal taxpayers, in the
abstract, may have no interest in increasing applicant pools at one school as opposed to another,
individual taxpayers surely do. Presumably, this is one of the reasons that taxpayers, including
many Members of Congress, support and contribute to their alma maters and to their local
schools . . . .” NCAA Answers W&M on Tax-Exemption, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 17, 2006,
LEXIS, 2006 TNT 222-20. In essence, Brand seems to be saying that the fundamental basis for
extending a tax exemption to college football and basketball is that they are highly popular with
members of Congress and their constituents. This seems to be an accurate analysis of the history
of the exemption and is likely an accurate description of the current situation. Senator Charles
Grassley, the ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Finance, has called for
hearings on the question. See Golden, supra. Whether these hearings take place and, if so,
whether they result in any change will reveal the current accuracy of Brand’s analysis.
7. For a more detailed discussion of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), see BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW
OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 63–317 (8th ed. 2003).
8. Two additional constraints, not relevant for this article, limit the exemption to
organizations “no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
9. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) exempts only organizations “no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”
10. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) exempts only organizations “organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to
foster national or international amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals.”
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The key word is “charitable.” Courts of equity interpreting the law of charitable
trust have generally interpreted the term broadly, looking for purposes “designed to
accomplish objects that are beneficial to the community—i.e., to the public or
indefinite members thereof—without also serving what amount to private trust
purposes.”11 The IRS has long adopted this interpretation of the exempt purposes
requirement.12
B. The Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT)
1. General
Exempt organizations owe a tax—the “unrelated business income tax” (UBIT)—on
their “unrelated business taxable income.”13 The UBIT applies only if three conditions
are met.14 First, the exempt organization has income from the conduct of a business.
Second, the exempt organization regularly carries on that business. Finally, the
business is not substantially related (except as a source of funds) to the exempt
organization’s performance of its exempt functions. In addition to these restrictions,
the UBIT also excludes specified categories of “passive” income, such as dividends
and royalties.15
Accordingly, for UBIT purposes, income is first divided into tax-free “passive”
income (income that fits into certain excluded categories) and potentially taxable
“active” income (income from all other sources). Active income is further divided into
tax-free “related” income (income from the active conduct of a business related to an
exempt purpose), and taxable “unrelated” income (income from all other active
business endeavors).
New York University’s (NYU) acquisition of the Mueller Noodle Company—the
poster case for the UBIT—provides an easy framework to illustrate these distinctions.16
If NYU earns income by operating the C.F. Mueller pasta factory, that business is
regularly carried on and bears no relationship to NYU’s educational purpose. The
income is taxable. By contrast, if NYU has a culinary school that teaches students to
make pasta, NYU is regularly carrying on a business (education for tuition payments),
but the business is related to NYU’s exempt purpose. The UBIT does not apply. If
NYU receives dividends on the publicly traded common stock of the American Italian
Pasta Company or interest from that company’s bonds, that income fits into the passive

11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 general cmt. a (1992) (citation omitted).
12. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1). This regulation was first adopted in 1959. See
T.D. 6391, 1959-2 C.B. 139, 144. Subsequent amendments have not changed the basic
definition of an exempt purpose.
13. See I.R.C. § 511. Generally speaking, UBIT is adjusted gross income less deductible
expenses directly related to an unrelated business. See I.R.C. §§ 512(a), 513(a). The UBIT is
levied at either the corporate or trust rates, depending on the nature of the exempt organization.
See I.R.C. § 511(a)(1) (corporations); id. § 511(b)(1) (trusts).
14. See I.R.C. §§ 512(a), 513(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a).
15. See I.R.C. § 512(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1.
16. See C. F. Mueller Co. v. Comm’r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951) for the facts of the
actual case. This paragraph merely uses those facts, and variations on them, to illustrate the
current rule. Those rules did not apply when the actual transaction took place.
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income exceptions to the UBIT. The UBIT does not apply. Finally, if the C.F. Mueller
Company donates money to NYU, the donation does not derive from the conduct of a
business. The UBIT does not apply.
Because I will be discussing transactions that can be characterized either as
donations or quid pro quo payments for services rendered, it is worth emphasizing that
the payor’s tax treatment of a transaction is a distinct matter. Businesses can deduct
most payments to charity either as charitable contributions under Section 170 of the
Code or general business expenses under Section 162 of the Code.17 The business’s
choice of deduction has no direct bearing on whether the charity must pay UBIT.18
As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the exemption and the UBIT must be understood
primarily in terms of symbolic politics.19 The charitable exemption’s subsidy for
charities is not an efficient mechanism for achieving specific policy results. Rather, it is
a symbolic expression of public support for the general idea of organizations dedicated
to good works. The UBIT serves to protect the exemption politically by protecting the
perception that the exemption only subsidizes activities that fit this general idea. The
UBIT deters charities from engaging in active business pursuits that do not conform
with popular conceptions of charity. By keeping charities away from such activities, it
preserves the political symbolism that supports the charitable tax exemption.
2. Advertising/Sponsorship
The paradigmatic unrelated business is a stand-alone operation, such as NYU’s
noodle business, unrelated to any exempt function. Code Section 513(c) extends the
UBIT further to include unrelated businesses carried out within the context of exempt
activities. The original impetus for this rule, and one of its main applications, is
advertising income.20 An exempt organization could provide stand-alone advertising
services, for instance by operating a billboard. Generally, however, exempt
organizations provide advertising services in the context of their exempt activities. For
example, an educational magazine may sell advertising pages. Either way, the revenue
is taxable.
Although advertising revenues are taxable, “qualified sponsorship payments” are
not.21 Under Section 513(i) of the Code, a “qualified sponsorship payment” is a
payment for which the exempt organization gives no “substantial return benefit other
than the use or acknowledgement of the name or logo (or product lines) of [the
payor’s] trade or business in connection with the activities of [the recipient].”22 In
order to qualify, a “use or acknowledgement” of the payor’s name or logo must not

17. The Code limits a corporation’s charitable deductions to ten percent of taxable income.
See I.R.C. § 170(b)(2). There is no such limit on business deductions.
18. Some of the issues involved are closely analogous. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem.
81-45-020 1981 PLR LEXIS 5860 (July 30, 1981) (explaining that benefits to business from
community goodwill and economic development are too remote to justify business expense
deduction).
19. The following discussion is based on Stone, supra note 5.
20. For a discussion of this history, see infra notes 102–107 and accompanying text.
21. I.R.C. § 513(i)(1).
22. Id. § 513(i)(2)(A).
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include any “advertising [of the payor’s] products or services.”23 In addition, payments
contingent on the amount of public exposure of the message (such as television ratings)
do not qualify.24 Finally, acknowledgements in print periodicals and certain convention
and trade show activities also do not qualify.25
On its face, Section 513(c) appears to set the general rule—advertising income is
taxable—and Section 513(i) appears to define a limited exception for arrangements
that do not constitute advertising. This appearance is deceptive. Section 513(i)
effectively exempts almost all advertising income, if we understand “advertising”
colloquially to mean posting a commercial message for pay. Before I give a technical
explanation, consider this practical example.
The 2005 Capital One Bowl26 was organized by Florida Citrus Sports Association,
Inc. (FCSA), a tax-exempt nonprofit whose exempt purpose is to “promote and foster
an interest in amateur athletics.”27 FCSA acknowledged the game’s chief sponsor—
Capital One—by naming the game for it. FCSA likewise acknowledged Capital One by
placing the game logo (containing Capital One’s name) on the players’ uniforms and in
the center of the field. It also painted Capital One’s name on both sides of the field at
each twenty-yard line, ensuring that most television pictures of the game would include
Capital One’s name. Capital One’s name was also placed on billboards around the
stadium and on screen when the players were introduced.28 It is safe to assume that
Capital One secured these acknowledgements as enforceable consideration for a
sponsorship payment to FCSA and that FCSA did not pay tax on the payment.
In technical terms, this results from the interaction between the provisions of
Section 513(i). First, Section 513(i) emphasizes that income from an acknowledgement
transaction can be exempt, even if the transaction is a quid pro quo exchange. This
means that the IRS cannot establish taxability merely by demonstrating that the sponsor
had little or no donative intent. The only limit is that the charity’s service to the
sponsor cannot be “advertising.” Advertising, however, is not defined, other than by a
nonexclusive list of examples, all of which describe direct exhortations to buy, rather

23. Id.
24. See id. § 513(i)(2)(B)(i).
25. See id. § 513(i)(2)(B)(ii). Convention and trade show activities are separately excluded
under I.R.C. § 513(d). Print periodical advertising was the original impetus for Section 513(c),
and the subject of United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986). See
infra notes 102–107 and accompanying text. Special rules also govern the deduction of the
exempt organization’s costs against revenue attributable to an unrelated activity that “exploits”
an exempt-purpose activity. See Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(d) (general rules); id. § 1.512(a)-1(f)
(periodical advertising rules).
26. University of Iowa 30, Louisiana State 25. See Randy Peterson, Great Tate: MVP’s
Game-Ending TD Pass Beats LSU in Bowl, DES MOINES REG., Jan. 2, 2005, at 1C; see also
http://www.iowaalum.com/pub/music/ iafight.wav. (last visited Sept. 23, 2006). Go Hawks.
27. See Florida Citrus Sports Association, Inc., Return of Organization Exempt from
Income Tax, Form 990, Part III & Statement 3 (2003), available at http://www.guidestar.org/
FinDocuments/2004/591/058/2004-591058144-1-9.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2006) [hereinafter
Capital One Bowl Form 990].
28. Capital One Bowl (ABC television broadcast Jan. 1, 2005).
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than more subtle forms of brand promotion.29 Finally, even if the IRS can prove that a
charity agreed to provide “advertising” services to its sponsor, the charity owes tax
only on the portion of the total payment properly allocated to those services.30
The upshot: the deck is stacked against the IRS except in cases closely matching the
statute’s examples. Any attempt by the IRS to define a broader scope for “advertising”
faces a built-in defense. Section 513(i) is clear on only one point: commercial
sponsorships are usually exempt. Everything else is arguable (and defensible) and tax
is due only to the extent the IRS wins the argument.
The IRS finalized regulations under Section 513(i) in 2002.31 The final regulations
at first appear to add teeth to Section 513(i) by defining “advertising” functionally as
any message that “promotes or markets any trade or business, or any service, facility,
or product.”32 This language is derived from Federal Communication Commission
(FCC) regulations governing sponsorship credits.33 It is intended to allow charities to
identify sponsors, but not promote them. In theory, the IRS might argue that a very
aggressive acknowledgement could cross that functional line, even if it did not include
overt sales promotion.
Examined more carefully, however, the regulations achieve the same effect as the
statute. The functional definition of advertising is qualified by a list of sponsor benefits
that never constitute advertising.34 These exceptions effectively swallow the rule and
leave “advertising” defined by the statute’s examples. Again, the only clear message is
that revenue from quid pro quo deals, in which a sponsor pays a charity to publicize
brand-promotion messages, is not necessarily taxable.
C. The Controversy over Sponsorships
I will discuss the sponsorship controversy in greater detail below.35 I begin,
however, with this brief summary to situate the reader. As discussed above, when the
public controversy over sponsorship revenues began in 1991, Section 513(c) of the
Code already applied the UBIT to advertising income. The IRS had also already
considered the tax treatment of donor acknowledgements in analogous contexts. It had

29. See I.R.C. § 513(i)(2)(A) (“messages containing qualitative or comparative language,
price information, or other indications of savings or value, an endorsement, or an inducement to
purchase, sell, or use such products or services”).
30. See id. § 513(i)(3).
31. See Taxation of Tax-Exempt Organizations’ Income from Corporate Sponsorship, 67
Fed. Reg. 20,433 (Apr. 25, 2002) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(v).
33. Commission Policy Concerning the Noncommercial Nature of Educational
Broadcasting Stations, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,534 § 13 (Apr. 5, 1984) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73)
[hereinafter FCC Rules]. As will be discussed below, Section 513(i) itself derives from the FCC
Rules. See infra notes 53, 136–140 and accompanying text.
34. This list of permitted messages is “exclusive sponsorship arrangements; logos and
slogans that do not contain qualitative or comparative descriptions of the payor’s products,
services, facilities or company; a list of the payor’s locations, telephone numbers, or Internet
address; value-neutral descriptions, including displays or visual depictions, of the payor’s
product-line or services; and the payor’s brand or trade names and product or service listings.”
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iv).
35. See infra notes 114–158 and accompanying text.
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concluded that such acknowledgements were not improper self-dealing between the
charity and donor, and that they would not prevent donors from deducting the
acknowledged contributions as charitable donations.36 In each case, the IRS treated the
transaction as a donation, even if the donor bargained for an enforceable right to be
acknowledged. The theory was that acknowledgements had only an incidental value to
donors. The rule, however, did not seem to depend on the value of particular
acknowledgements. The rulings did not consider whether the facts seemed to indicate a
quid pro quo deal. Rather, they seemed conclusively to presume that acknowledging a
donor, whatever its value, was not the kind of benefit that could transform a donation
into an exchange.37
Consequently, it surprised many when the IRS issued two Technical Advice
Memoranda (“Bowl TAMs”)38 in 1991, holding that payments to sponsor the Mobile
Cotton Bowl and John Hancock Bowl were taxable unrelated business income in the
hands of the exempt organizations that presented the games.39 The Bowl TAMs
recharacterized the IRS’s prior rulings as holding only “that recognition of a donor’s
generosity can be an insubstantial return benefit.”40 They then held that the recognition
provided to the bowl sponsors, unlike the acknowledgements in prior rulings, had

36. See Treas. Reg. § 53-4941(d)-2(f)(9), Example (4) (finding no self-dealing in gift
conditioned on naming rights), adopted in T.D. 7270, 1973-1 C.B. 473, 483 (as amended in
T.D. 8639, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,568 (Dec. 20, 1995)); Rev. Rul. 77-367, 1977-2 C.B. 193 (granting
tax exemption to organization operating replica of nineteenth-century village, although village
would bear corporate sponsor’s name and corporate sponsor would feature village in its own
advertising); Rev. Rul. 73-407, 1973-2 C.B. 383 (holding exempt organization’s agreement to
adopt name of a major contributor for at least one hundred years not prohibited self-dealing);
Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104 (holding donations to clubs deductible despite
acknowledgement of donors); Rev. Rul. 67-342, 1967-2 C.B. 187 (approving exemption of
educational television production company despite on-air acknowledgement of program
sponsors, without “mention . . . of products or services sold by the sponsors”).
37. The point of Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104, for instance, was to emphasize that
club dues might be deductible donations or not, depending on the value of membership
privileges. In the context of this fact-heavy test, the IRS stated flatly that “[s]uch privileges as
being associated with or being known as a benefactor of the organization are not significant
return benefits that have a monetary value within the meaning of this Revenue Ruling.”
38. A Technical Advice Memorandum is a form of nonprecedential guidance provided by
the IRS national office at the request of field agents.
39. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-31-001, 1991 PLR LEXIS 2722 (Oct. 22, 1991) (John
Hancock Bowl); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007, 1991 PLR LEXIS 1778 (Aug. 16, 1991)
(Mobile Cotton Bowl) [hereinafter Cotton Bowl TAM, and, together with TAM 92-31-001, the
Bowl TAMs]. The IRS is legally required to excise taxpayers’ names and identifying details
before releasing TAMs. Nonetheless, the taxpayers’ identities were widely known. See, e.g.,
Edited Transcript of Winter EO Committee Meeting: Luncheon Speech—Cotton Bowl
Comments, 5 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 615, 616 (1992) [hereinafter Winter 1992 Meeting]
(comments of Bruce Bernstien, who represented Cotton Bowl on audit). Some of the terms of
the Cotton Bowl’s contract with Mobile likewise leaked. See Paul Streckfus, A Glimpse of the
Mobile Cotton Bowl Contract Provisions, 55 TAX NOTES 447 (1992).
40. Cotton Bowl TAM, supra note 39, at *13 (emphasis added).
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substantial value. The IRS began to take the same position in audits of other bowl
game organizers and Olympic sports federations.41
The targeted charities responded on three fronts, by: (1) fighting the audits, (2)
enlisting members of Congress to propose legislation, and (3) whipping up concern
among charities generally.42 The IRS’s first reaction was to publish proposed audit
guidelines (“Audit Guidelines”) to explain its position.43 The Audit Guidelines first
noted that “[m]ere acknowledgement or recognition of a corporate contributor as a
benefactor normally is incidental to the receipt of a contribution and is not of sufficient
benefit to give rise to unrelated trade or business income.”44 They then told auditors to
examine sponsorships for signs of advertising sales and provided a list of suggestive
facts.45 Finally, the Audit Guidelines instructed auditors that
[a]s a matter of audit tolerance, the Service will not apply these guidelines to
organizations that are of a purely local nature, that receive relatively insignificant
gross revenue from corporate sponsors and generally operate with significant
amounts of volunteer labor. Generally, included among these are youth athletic
organizations such as little league baseball and soccer teams, and local theatres
and youth orchestras.46

Although the Audit Guidelines were formally only a guide to field agents, the IRS
saw them as “baby regs” and provided a public comment period and hearings in July
1992.47 The result was a flood of negative written comments, followed by angry
hearings.48
Meanwhile, Congress took up the issue. The first bills reversing the Bowl TAMs
appeared several months before the Bowl TAMs themselves.49 These bills simply
excluded activities related to amateur athletic events (apparently including outright
advertising) from the definition of unrelated business. In the fall of 1992, a few months
after the IRS’s Audit Guidelines hearings, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1992,

41. See Mike Fish, IRS Tries to Tax Money Raised by Olympic Sponsorships, 5 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 458 (1992).
42. For a discussion of the Bowl’s position in the audit, see Winter 1992 Meeting, supra
note 39 (comments of Bruce Bernstien, who was representing Cotton Bowl on audit). For a
survey of bills introduced from 1991 to 1996, see Keith L. Henderson, The Tax Treatment of
Corporate Sponsorship Payments and the Aftermath of the Cotton Bowl Ruling, 13 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 789 (1996). For a description of the efforts to spark broader concern, see Gilbert
Fuchsberg, Special Events Organizers Gird To Battle IRS, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1991, at B1.
43. See I.R.S. Announcement 92-15, 1992-5 I.R.B. 51 [hereinafter Audit Guidelines].
44. Id. at 51 (Purpose).
45. See id. § 178.3.
46. Id. § 178.2.
47. See Paul Streckfus & Julianne MacKinnon, Non-Profit Tax Conference Updates
Charities on the Latest Developments, 5 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 411, 411 (1992).
48. Paul Streckfus, IRS’s Pre-Inaugural Gift for Charities, 7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 179,
179 (1992) [hereinafter Streckfus, Gift].
49. See S. 866, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 538, 102d Cong. (1991). The bowls had evidently
concluded that the IRS would rule adversely. See Winter 1992 Meeting, supra note 39, at 622
(comments of Ed Knight). For a survey of bills introduced from 1991 to 1996, see Henderson,
supra note 42.
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which would have become law but for a veto (unrelated to the UBIT issue).50 It
contained a UBIT exemption for event-sponsorship revenues that was even more
explicit than the earlier bills in covering advertising revenue for a category of events
obviously designed to fit college bowl games, the NCAA’s March Madness, and the
Olympics.51
A few months later, the IRS scrapped the Audit Guidelines and instead proposed
formal regulations (“1993 Regulations”).52 The 1993 Regulations were based on the
FCC’s rules for sponsor acknowledgement.53 The 1993 Regulations allowed exempt
organizations to enter into openly commercial sponsorship deals without incurring tax
liability. They tried to limit the practice, however, by distinguishing between
“advertising” that had the effect of promoting the sponsor’s goods or services and
“acknowledgements” that did not.54 Only the latter enjoyed a safe harbor from the
UBIT. The 1993 Regulations also included a “tainting rule”: any arrangement that
mixed advertising and sponsor acknowledgement would be ineligible for special
treatment as a sponsor acknowledgement.55
The charities favored the 1993 Regulations, but opposed the tainting rule.56
Although they pressured the Treasury to finalize the 1993 Regulations, however, years
passed with no sign that it planned to do so.57 Eventually, the charities once again

50. See Bennett Minton, Bush Vetoes Tax Bill, 92 TAX NOTES TODAY 223-1 (1992).
51. See H.R. 11, 102d Cong. § 7303 (1992); Conference Report on Tax Bill Passes Senate,
92 TAX NOTES TODAY 214-97 (1992) (reporting on passage of act). H.R. 11 excluded from
UBIT “Qualified Sponsorship Payments” received in conjunction with “Qualified Public
Events.” “Qualified Sponsorship Payments” included “the use of the name or logo of [a
sponsor’s] trade or business in connection with any Qualified Public Event under arrangements
(including advertising) in connection with such event which acknowledge such person’s
sponsorship or promote such person’s products or services,” as well as VIP privileges at the
event. “Qualified Public Event” included any event substantially related to the presenting
charity’s exempt purpose, as well as any event held only once a year for less than thirty days.
The Olympics organizers secured a separate provision in the same bill, providing that any
payment for which “a substantial part of the consideration” was the right to use the Olympics’
trademarks would be considered a royalty for purposes of the UBIT. See H.R. 11 § 7304.
52. See Taxation of Tax-Exempt Organizations’ Income from Corporate Sponsorship, 58
Fed. Reg. 5,687 (Jan. 22, 1993) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) [hereinafter 1993 Regulations].
53. See id. at 5,688 (describing origin in FCC Rules); FCC Rules, supra note 33, § 13. By
1992, Congress had partially codified the FCC’s approach. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 399A–399B
(1984).
54. See 1993 Regulations, supra note 52, at 5,690.
55. See id. Arrangements that did not qualify as acknowledgements might still escape UBIT
on more general grounds. For instance, if the charity had not provided a substantial return
benefit to the donor, it would be hard to argue that it had received income from a trade or
business. Likewise, income might fall into a category of income exempt from UBIT, such as
royalties. For a discussion of the requirements of the UBIT, see supra notes 13–16 and
accompanying text.
56. Unofficial Transcript of IRS Hearing on Corporate Sponsorship Regs., 93 TAX NOTES
TODAY 147–23 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Hearing Transcript].
57. See, e.g., Nonprofit Advisors Turn to Capitol Hill for Corporate Sponsorship Guidance,
TAX DAY REP. (CCH), at A.2 (May 1, 1995) (citing Treasury explanation that “questions that
have come up in the process of working on other projects that involve UBIT issues have, in turn,
raised additional concerns with the corporate sponsorship regulations”); Paul Streckfus, Editor’s
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turned to Congress. The current text of Section 513(i) was first passed in the 1995
budget act, which was vetoed for other reasons.58 It became law two years later in the
Taxpayers Relief Act of 1997.59 I have outlined its provisions above.60
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ADVERTISING AND SPONSOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
My first task is to tease apart and analyze the confused and unexamined conceptions
about advertising and sponsor acknowledgement that undergirded the sponsorship
controversy in the 1990s. My thesis is that prior accounts are incomplete for two
reasons. First, they have not taken into account the conceptual distinction between
advertising and sponsor acknowledgement. Second, they have not differentiated
between (1) the advertising/sponsor acknowledgement distinction, and (2) the more
familiar conceptual distinction between commercial and gratuitous payments.
Understanding these distinctions and the difference between them is important to
understanding the sponsorship controversy. The 1993 Regulations and Section 513(i)
represent not simply a retreat from the IRS’s initial position, but a reconceptualization
of the problem.
Accordingly, before analyzing the events of the 1990s, I will first develop the
distinction between advertising and sponsorship and then discuss two ways in which
that distinction is important for understanding the UBIT’s application to sponsorship
revenues. Subpart A discusses the conceptual distinction between advertising and
sponsor acknowledgement. In Subpart B, I point out that this distinction is not the same
as the distinction between commercial and gratuitous transactions, with which it is
often confused. In Subpart C, I show that the two distinctions are not only conceptually
distinct, but also have different meanings in the context of the symbolic politics that
support the charitable exemption and underlie the UBIT.
A. Distinction Between Advertising and Sponsor Acknowledgement
This Subpart distinguishes two types of quid pro quo transaction between charities
and third parties: advertising and sponsor acknowledgement. It is worth emphasizing
that as I am using these terms, neither involves any element of gratuitous altruism. In
each case a business (the advertiser/sponsor) pays a charity to transmit a commercially
valuable message (an advertisement or sponsorship acknowledgement). This

Notebook, 11 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 311, 311 (1995) (discussing efforts to finalize the
regulations); Testimony of the American Society of Association (ASAE) Before the Committee on
Ways & Means of the U.S. House of Representatives, 12 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 371, 376
(1995) (complaining about delay); Treasury Working on Corporate Sponsorship, 11 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 875 (1995) (February 2, 1995 letter from Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary
for Tax Policy, Department of the Treasury, replying to letter from Senator J. Bennett Johnston).
58. See H.R. 2491, 104th Cong. § 12702 (1995) (as passed by the Senate on October 27,
1995), reprinted in 211 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Special Supp., at d39 (Nov. 1, 1995); Ann
Devroy & Eric Pianin, Clinton Vetoes GOP’s 7-Year Balanced Budget Plan, WASH. POST, Dec.
7, 1995, at A1.
59. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 965, 111 Stat. 788, 893–94
(1997) (codified as I.R.C. § 513(i)).
60. See generally supra notes 21–34 and accompanying text (discussing Section 513(i) and
subsequent regulations).
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distinction, while at the center of the sponsorship controversy, has never been clearly
separated in the legal literature from the distinction between gifts and sponsorships,
although it has been much discussed in academic and professional marketing literature.
The distinction is simple in theory: transactions in which the sponsor pays to be
connected to the sponsored organization and transactions in which an advertiser pays
for exposure for a commercial message. To illustrate it in the UBIT context, consider
what would constitute a “pure” sale of advertisement for UBIT purposes. To qualify,
the arrangement could allow no argument that the payor was merely receiving a “thank
you” for a gratuitous donation. The only possible description would be a payment for
advertising services.
An easy example is a charity-owned billboard, rented on commercial terms.61
Assume the charity exerts no substantive control over messages posted and that the
billboard exhibits no obvious connection to its owner. It is impossible to characterize
the leasing of billboard space as a donation and acknowledgement. No viewer could
understand the billboard as a communication by the owner, let alone as a “thank you”
to the advertiser. The billboard’s value depends solely on its visibility. I call this pure
advertising value a “billboard effect.”
Contrast this to a pure paid sponsor acknowledgement, in which the sponsor pays
for a “thank you” but cannot be said to have paid for a billboard effect. These are rare
in the real world. To give a plausible example, however, assume that a drug maker
sponsors rural clinics in an undeveloped country. The sponsor insists on the contractual
right to place a large sign with its logo at each clinic entrance. Why? The signs provide
no billboard effect. Drug makers aim their commercial communications at patients,
prescribing doctors, regulators, and politicians in developed countries, none of whom
will see the signs. The signs’ value is the association they make between the drug
company and a worthy cause. To realize the value of this association, of course, the
drug maker needs to design advertisements (featuring pictures of the clinic) and display
them where developed-country consumers, doctors, regulators, and politicians will see
them. The transaction with the clinic, however, is valuable and distinct from the ad
buys that eventually publicize it. I call this pure association value a “halo effect.”
Scholars of marketing have noted and studied this distinction between billboards
and halos for decades. The upshot of the marketing research is that one of the unique
benefits of sponsorship is its ability to generate a halo effect—an association between a
company or brand and the goodwill of a well-liked organization or event.62 Marketing

61. Assume also that the owner provided services beyond simple access to real property,
such as workers to paint the billboard, so that the arrangement could not be exempt as rent. See
I.R.C. § 512(b)(3).
62. See, e.g., Drew Barrand, Sizing Up Sponsorship, MARKETING, Aug. 2, 2006, at 17
(quoting an advertising agency executive who states, “‘[t]here will always be people who equate
sponsorship to a media buy because it makes it easier to understand. But this type of thinking
removes the principal benefits of using sponsorship—that it can deliver much more for your
brand than pure media exposure. Sponsorship is not just about how many times your logo
appears on TV.’”); Paul N. Bloom et al., How Social-Cause Marketing Affects Consumer
Perceptions, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Winter 2006, at 49, 51 (“We hypothesize that the
primary reason why demonstrating a high degree of affinity can enhance the effectiveness of a
promotional initiative is that it increases the likelihood that consumers will treat the initiative
itself—or, more generally, the brand’s ‘style of marketing’—as an important and positively
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scholars also recognize that a sponsor cannot fully realize this value from the billboard
effect of brand exposure at a well-publicized event.63 The impact of such exposure is
highly contingent and depends in large part on the strength of the association between
the sponsor and the halo of the sponsored organization or event.
Marketing researchers have repeatedly stressed that a perceived fit between the
sponsor and the event sponsored tends to make sponsorship more effective. If the fit is
wrong, sponsorship can backfire. Viewers perceive that the sponsored organization has
sold out. This perception can damage both the sponsor and the sponsored
organization.64 Genuine supporters of cool things look cool, but obviously false fans
weighted attribute of the brand.”); James Crimmins & Martin Horn, Sponsorship: From
Management Ego Trip to Marketing Success, J. ADVERTISING RES., July/August 1996, at 11, 12
(“Sponsorship is a means of persuasion that is fundamentally different from traditional
advertising . . . Sponsorship improves the perception of a brand by flanking our beliefs about the
brand and linking the brand to an event or organization that the target audience already values
highly.”); Tony Meenaghan, Sponsorship—Legitimising the Medium, 25 EUR. J. MARKETING 5,
8 (1991) [hereinafter, Meenaghan 1991] (noting “goodwill” aspect of sponsorship as principal
difference from advertising); Dennis M. Sandler & David Shani, Olympic Sponsorship vs.
“Ambush” Marketing: Who Gets the Gold?, J. ADVERTISING RES., August/September 1989, at 9,
10 (defining sponsorship as “[t]he provision of resources (e.g. money, people, equipment) by an
organization directly to an event or activity in exchange for a direct association to the event or
activity.”).
63. An advertising executive, for instance, recently reacted to evidence that advertisers
doubt sponsorships affect brand visibility and that viewers do not recall cluttered sponsors’
brands, by noting that “advertisers are still keen to connect with people’s interests and passions.
It would be naïve to suggest that these advertisers . . . are [pursuing sponsorships] just for
broadcast exposure.” Alastair Reid, Is Sponsorship Really Worth It?, CAMPAIGN, Feb. 11, 2005,
at 10 (quoting Laurence Munday).
64. See Karen L. Becker-Olsen & Carolyn J. Simmons, When Do Social Sponsorships
Enhance or Dilute Equity? Fit, Message Sources, and the Persistence of Effects, 29 ADVANCES
IN CONSUMER RES. 287 (2002); Bloom et al., supra note 62; Michel Tuan Pham & Gita
Venkataramani Johar, Market Prominence Biases in Sponsor Identification: Processes and
Consequentiality, 18 PSYCHOL. AND MARKETING 123 (2001) [hereinafter Pham 2001]; Richard
Speed & Peter Thompson, Determinants of Sports Sponsorship Response, 28 J. OF THE ACAD. OF
MARKETING SCI. 227 (2000). Some recent experiments found that social-cause sponsorships,
whether high-fit or low-fit, improved consumer perceptions of a beer brand, whereas
sponsorships of commercial events degraded perceptions. See Bloom, et al., supra note 62.
There is also evidence that the combination of a good fit and a high-status event sends a
message of insincerity by making the sponsor’s instrumental reasons for sponsoring the event
too obvious. See Speed & Thompson, supra, at 236. The viewers’ level of interest and
involvement with the sponsored activity also makes a difference, although not in straightforward
ways. See Aron Levin, Chris Joiner & Gary Cameron, The Impact of Sports Sponsorship on
Consumers’ Brand Attitudes and Recall: The Case of NASCAR Fans, J. CURR. ISSUES & RES. IN
ADVERTISING, Fall 2001, at 23 (finding level of involvement affects impact of sponsorship on
brand attitude but not recall); Michel Tuan Pham, Effects of Involvement, Arousal, and Pleasure
on the Recognition of Sponsorship Stimuli, in ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RESEARCH 85 (John F.
Sherry & Brian Sternthal eds. 1992) [hereinafter Pham 1992] (finding brand recall increasing
with greater levels of involvement to a point and then diminishing and that greater levels of
arousal diminish recall); See also Sponsorship to Reveal Its Full Brand Potential, MARKETING
WK., Dec. 2, 2004, at 17 (reporting British ITV network’s decision to discontinue service
measuring viewer recall of sponsor brands in favor of “qualitative” measurement of “the creative
fit between programme and sponsor”); Rich Thomaselli, Now, Many Words From Our Sponsor,
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look lame.65 “Ambush marketers” can also snatch the halo from an unwary sponsor’s
head with advertising messages that suggest a sponsorship relationship where none
exists.66
Marketing scholars have also long recognized another aspect of sponsorships that
drew the IRS’s attention as it approached the issue in the late 1980s: halo deals usually
include a significant billboard effect.67 Popular events are natural billboards. This
billboard effect of sponsorship is easy to quantify, and therefore received much
attention in the 1980s, as sponsorships became increasingly commercial and
professional. Evaluation consultants, eager to tout their services to sponsors, and
marketers, eager to justify increasing sponsorship expenditures, liked this simple
measure.68 The IRS was heavily influenced by reports on this kind of sponsorship
evaluation when it was preparing the Bowl TAMs.69

ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 3, 2005, at 6 (describing efforts of a Detroit Pistons’ sponsor to offset
“any perception of overkill with the Rock Financial logo” by community work with Pistons
players and distribution of free Pistons tickets to “charity and youth groups.”).
65. See, e.g., Kevin P. Gwinner, A Model of Image Creation and Image Transfer in Event
Sponsorship, 14 INT’L MARKETING REV. 145, 150 (1997) (“The perceived promotional
appearance of a brand’s sponsorship activities may appear anywhere along a spectrum from
advertiser to benefactor. A perception towards the benefactor end of the spectrum may lead to
increased feelings of goodwill towards the brand because it is perceived as donating funds to
make the event possible. Conversely, there may be a negative reaction to the commercialization
of events that have not been sponsored in the past. These events may be perceived as ‘selling
out’ to the corporate world.”). But see Horst Stipp & Nicholas P. Schiavone, Modeling the
Impact of Olympic Sponsorship on Corporate Image, J. ADVERTISING RES., July/August 1996, at
22, 24 (interpreting results of consumer survey of reaction to Olympic sponsorship to mean that
consumers were aware of sponsors’ commercial goals, but were nonetheless favorably disposed
towards them). Knauer ignores this dynamic and improbably assumes that the form of deduction
a business takes for its sponsorship payments (a fact not publicly disclosed) plays a significant
role in determining whether the public confers a halo. See Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of
Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation, and the Social
Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 42–43 (1994) [hereinafter Knauer, Paradox].
66. See, e.g., Tony Meenaghan, Ambush Marketing—A Threat to Corporate Sponsorship,
38 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 103, 106 (1996); Sandler & Shani, supra note 62, at 51; Sponsorship Is
More than Just a Logo, BRAND STRATEGY, Sept. 15, 2004, at 46, 47–48 (reporting ambush
marketing at the Euro 2004 soccer tournament and Mastercard’s efforts to counter it by
leveraging its sponsorship).
67. See, e.g., Crimmins & Horn, supra note 62, at 12; John A. Meenaghan, Commercial
Sponsorship, 7 EUR. J. MARKETING 5, 23–24 (1983).
68. See, e.g., Speed & Thompson, supra note 64, at 227 (criticizing focus of consultants
with “origins . . . in publicity and public relations” on measuring exposure).
69. See Paul Streckfus, Service’s EO Office Cracks Down on ‘Big Business’ Aspect of
Nonprofits, 5 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 787, 787 (1992) [hereinafter Streckfus, EO Office]
(quoting James McGovern, IRS Associate Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt
Organizations)); Transcript of the Afternoon Session of the Spring EO Committee Meeting:
Panel 6: Unrelated Business Income Tax Issues, 6 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 388, 391–92 (1992)
(statement of Beth Purcell, Office of Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt
Organizations)) [hereinafter Spring 1992 Meeting]. For the reports in question, see STEPHEN A.
GREYSER & JOHN L. TEOPACO, HARVARD BUS. SCH., JOHN HANCOCK FINANCIAL SERVICES:
SPORTS SPONSORSHIP (1987); Michael J. McCarthy, Keeping Careful Score on Sports Tie-Ins,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1991, at B1.
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The billboard effect often provides a significant part of a sponsorship’s value.70
Marketers are generally aware, however, that they cannot draw a one-to-one
correspondence between casual brand exposure in the course of an event and brand
exposure through traditional advertising, in which the advertiser controls all aspects of
the exposure and can convey a crafted message. There is no automatic link between
brand exposure and effects on viewers. In particular, exposure seems to work
differently with and without concurrent advertising.71 It is accepted wisdom among
experts that a sponsor should spend several times more on advertising and other efforts
to purchase exposure for (and shape the message of) a sponsorship than it spends on
the actual sponsorship.72
Successful sponsorships blend billboard and halo effects and leverage the resulting
message with traditional advertising. For example, Capital One achieved a billboard
effect merely by sponsoring (and renaming) the Capital One Bowl. To emphasize and
elaborate on the association, however, Capital One also bought time from ABC to run
ads for its Prime Lock cards and No Hassle Rewards program during many breaks in
the broadcast.73
In practice, the distinction between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement is a
continuum, not a dichotomy between discrete categories. Real sponsorships fall
somewhere on this continuum between a hypothetical pure advertisement and pure
sponsorship. For an example of this, consider this cluster of public radio sponsorship
acknowledgements:
Support for NPR comes: from Visa, offering the Visa Signature Card, featuring
concierge services for travel, dining and entertainment, at visa.com/signature; from
AAAS and its journal Science, advancing science, serving society, and promoting
science literacy, on the web at aaas.org; and from Wal-Mart, providing jobs and

70. See, e.g., DAVID A. AAKER & ERICH JOACHIMSTHALER, BRAND LEADERSHIP 198, 201
(2000) (contrasting $15 million cost of Mastercard’s 1994 World Cup sponsorship with $25
million value of pure brand exposure, after applying 95% discount to normal advertising rates).
IEG’s 2005 survey of sponsorship decision makers’ goals found that about the same percentage
of decision makers rated “increase brand loyalty” (68%) and “create awareness/visibility” (65%)
as top goals. See IEG, Inc., Performance Research / IEG Study Highlights What Sponsors Want,
http://www.sponsorship.com/learn/decisionmakerstudy.asp. “Showcas[ing] community/social
responsibility” trailed at 43%. See id.
71. See, e.g., Levin et al., supra note 64 (studying differential effects of brands featured on
NASCAR cars, in advertising during broadcast, and both in conjunction); Pham 2001, supra
note 64 (finding impacts of overall brand prominence and clarity of brand-sponsor association
on both sponsorship recall and brand image); Pham 1992, supra note 64 (finding minor brand
recognition effects from billboards around a soccer field, decreasing as to intensely involved or
aroused viewers).
72. See, e.g., AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 70, at 225; Sponsorship is More than
Just a Logo, supra note 66, at 46. This conventional wisdom among experts is less than
universal among sponsors. A 2005 survey of sponsorship decision makers found that thirty
percent spent less leveraging the sponsorship than on the sponsorship itself. Roughly the same
percentage spent twice as much or more on leveraging. For the remainder the ratio was 1:1. See
IEG, supra note 70. These numbers nonetheless demonstrate that most sponsors do not expect to
get all or even most of the “billboard effect” they are seeking from the sponsorship itself.
73. See Capital One Bowl, supra note 28.
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opportunities for millions of Americans of all ages and all walks of life. Our
people make the difference. Information at walmartstores.com.74

The primary motive behind the Visa message seems to be advertising—the desire to
publicize the high-end “Signature Card” to an affluent and educated public radio
audience. Visa might also be interested in association with NPR, but the message
suggests that sales promotion is the main goal. The motives of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science are ambiguous. It may be sponsoring NPR
in pursuit of its charitable purpose—advancing the understanding of science—and
merely accepting recognition. It could also be an advertisement for the journal Science.
Wal-Mart is trying to rent a halo. It knows many members of the NPR audience,
including many community leaders who can make political trouble, view Wal-Mart as
rapacious.75 The message—which touts positive contributions to society, not everyday
low prices—is designed to emphasize an association with the public radio halo. On the
other hand, Wal-Mart must also be paying for the billboard effect of a nationwide radio
broadcast to the target audience.
It is important to note that the 1993 Regulations and Section 513(i), like the FCC
Rules they followed, use the distinction between advertising and sponsor
acknowledgement. Unlike prior doctrine, they allowed exempt organizations to enter
into openly commercial sponsorship deals. Rather than distinguish between
commercial and gratuitous transactions, they distinguished between transactions in
which the sponsor paid to be identified as such and transactions in which an advertiser
sought exposure for a message promoting sales.76 As will be discussed below,
identifying this distinction allows us to see that the IRS did not simply capitulate to
charities’ demands not to be taxed. Instead, it proposed a distinction between taxable
and exempt revenues that fit better into the political symbolism of the exemption and
the UBIT.
B. Distinction Between Advertising and Sponsor Acknowledgement Contrasted with
Distinction Between Commercial and Gratuitous Transactions
With the distinction between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement clearly in
mind, it is now possible to point out how it differs from the distinction that initially

74. All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 6, 2004).
75. See Constance L. Hays, Wal-Mart Tries to Shine Its Image by Supporting Public
Broadcasting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2004, at C1 (quoting a spokesperson describing the goal as
reaching “community leaders and [to] help them understand the value that we bring to their
areas”).
76. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. This is a simplification. The dividing
line is between payments made for a “substantial return benefit” and those that are not. I.R.C. §
513(i)(2)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(1). The regulations identify certain benefits, other than
advertising, that could constitute a substantial return benefit. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iii).
The thrust of Section 513(i) and the regulations, however, is not to inform us that payments to a
charity in exchange for substantial goods, services, or contractual rights might result in
unrelated business income. That is obvious. The innovation is that payments to a charity in
exchange for valuable sponsor acknowledgements can never produce UBIT, so long as the
acknowledgements do not include advertising.
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drove the sponsorship controversy: the distinction between commercial and gratuitous
transactions. As discussed above, payments to charities for advertising and sponsor
acknowledgement, as used here, are commercial transactions. Many payments to
charities, however, are gratuitous. Accordingly, we must consider a second conceptual
distinction when we examine sponsorships: the distinction between gratuitous gifts to
charity that the recipient charity publicly acknowledges and commercial payments
made for the purpose of securing a valuable public acknowledgement.
Charities customarily acknowledge their benefactors. Usually (at least for individual
donations) the parties nonetheless view the transaction as a gratuitous gift, not a
purchase of acknowledgement services.77 The psychology and economics of charitable
giving by individuals is a difficult and hotly debated topic.78 There are good reasons to
believe that individuals often give, not as a calculated strategy to achieve concrete
benefits, but rather because they value (as an end in itself) a self-image of generosity
and responsibility, conformance with social norms, or the well-being of other people or
things.79 Such donors may expect thanks without buying them. The charity’s grateful
acknowledgement of the gift is the socially expected response to a display of
generosity. The donor would be insulted (and society would condemn the charity) if
public thanks were not forthcoming. But expectations are not the same as
motivations.80 Examples of this kind of transaction abound. Many charities, for
instance, regularly distribute newsletters to their staff, donors, and volunteers listing
the names of significant donors.81
By contrast, ad buys and purchases of sponsor acknowledgements are not gifts.
They are payments for services. The sponsor has little or no altruistic motivation. It

77. The donor may feel subjectively that the transaction was “worth it.” However, any value
a genuine donor obtains (e.g., empathetic satisfaction or the satisfaction of conforming to social
or ideological norms) is not a scarce good ceded by the recipient at its market value. The transfer
of money is deceptive. The donor is not “buying” satisfaction. He is doing something with his
money that satisfies him. As will be discussed below, this is not true of a quid pro quo
sponsorship transaction in which the sponsor is deliberately purchasing a public
acknowledgement.
78. See John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable
Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories For The Deduction And Tax Exemption, 36
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 667–79 (2001) (describing theories).
79. See id. For purposes of this discussion, there is thankfully no need to descend into fine
distinctions between models of human behavior in which purely selfish individuals indulge
“tastes” for the well-being of others and models in which the existence of such “tastes” is taken
as evidence that people simply have unselfish motivations to begin with.
80. John Colombo labels such transactions with charities “quasi purchases” and proposes
that revenue from them be taxed. His logic is that the quid pro quo form of the transaction
indicates that the charity has overcome the free-rider problem in raising donations for which he
believes the exemption compensates. See id. at 686. I agree with his characterization of the
economic character of some of these transactions. In many other cases, however, I do not think a
donor who is acknowledged can fairly be said to have “purchased” the acknowledgement. Social
norms of gratitude may cause both the donor and donee to feel that a public acknowledgement is
particularly appropriate where the donor is clearly acting altruistically.
81. See, e.g., Thank You!, IOWA CITY HOSPICE COMMUNICATOR (Iowa City Hospice, Iowa
City, Iowa), Fall 2005, at 4–17, available at http://www.iowacityhospice.org/documents/
Fall2005Communicator.pdf (listing donors).
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values the charity’s acknowledgement at or above the money paid to secure that
acknowledgement. Examples of this kind of transaction also abound and have been
discussed above.82
This distinction between transfers made out of “disinterested generosity” and
transfers made as part of a quid pro quo exchange is familiar as a legal standard. In
theory, it still defines the legal divide between nontaxable gift revenues and potentially
taxable income, both with respect to taxable individuals and charities.83
Not surprisingly, in the initial stages of the sponsorship controversy, both the IRS
and the charities viewed the issue purely in light of the distinction between commercial
and gratuitous transactions. Before and in the immediate aftermath of the Bowl TAMs,
both the IRS and affected charities approached the sponsorship issue as litigants. From
this perspective, only existing doctrine mattered. The IRS’s position was that the Bowl
sponsorships were commercial arrangements, not donations. The charities’ opposition
mainly focused on technical UBIT issues, such as the definition of “regularly carried
on” and the royalty exception.84
The IRS’s initial position is easy to understand. The structure of the UBIT suggests
a dichotomy between gratuitous payments, which are exempt as gifts, and payments
received in the conduct of a trade or business, which are exempt only if the trade or
business is related to an exempt purpose. Congress seemed to confirm this structure in
1969 by adding Section 513(c) to tax advertisements. Likewise, the weight of doctrine
in related areas leads naturally to this point of view.85 From the IRS’s perspective, the
Bowl TAMs were a straightforward application of existing doctrine. A simple “thank
you” was not taxable, but a deal in which a sponsor paid full value for a valuable
commercial message was likely to be taxable advertising.
When the protests began, the IRS initially assumed it had been misunderstood
because the egregious facts of the Bowl TAMs had been redacted to comply with
taxpayer confidentiality requirements. At the height of the IRS’s initial confidence,
James J. McGovern, the Associate Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt
Organizations), was at pains to note that “mere acknowledgment of a donation would

82. See supra notes 26–28, 74–75 and accompanying text for examples.
83. See Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 689–703 (1989) (charitable donations);
Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285–286 (1960) (noncharitable gifts). The rules in
Hernandez and Duberstein are related but not identical. Duberstein turns on the donor’s
subjective intent, whereas Hernandez imposes an objective test to determine whether the
transfer was conditioned on receipt of a return benefit. In most cases, however, the only credible
evidence of the donor’s intent is receipt of a return benefit. The IRS quickly backed off of its
victory against the Scientologists in Hernandez, apparently out of fear that the courts would
force it to apply the standard to religions other than Scientology. See Allan J. Samansky,
Deductibility of Contributions to Religious Institutions, 24 VA. TAX REV. 65, 67–68 (2004). The
IRS’s decision to ignore the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Code, rather than seeking
new legislation in Congress, is problematic. Nonetheless, it casts serious doubts on the practical
importance of Hernandez.
84. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text for a summary of these statutory issues.
By giving scant attention to these arguments, I do not mean to imply that they were not well
taken. Their merits are not relevant to the discussion here, however, because the controversy
was not resolved on the basis of existing doctrine.
85. See supra notes 67–83 and accompanying text.
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still be allowed.”86 He then explained that “[w]hat you are seeing today is the IRS
looking at (tax-exempt) universities and hospitals and seeing them for what they are—
big businesses . . . a very different universe than what existed just 10 years ago.”87 The
IRS apparently thought this would quiet the protests. It assumed that the vast majority
of charities were not “big business” charities participating in commercial sponsorships
and those who were would recognize that they had been caught red handed.
Starting from this premise, the Audit Guidelines had two primary purposes: First
they were intended to warn “big business” charities and anyone thinking about joining
them that commercial arrangements would be taxable, no matter how they were
dressed. Second, they were intended to allay the fears of “authentic” charities that the
IRS was trying to tax customary arrangements.88
The Audit Guidelines tried to achieve their first objective by providing auditors
with a long list of facts and circumstances that might indicate a taxable arrangement.89
Among the facts evidencing advertising were promises to feature the sponsor’s name or
logo in the event name or elsewhere and payments contingent on receiving specified
TV ratings or other benefits (such as VIP treatment for sponsor personnel).90 Auditors
were to watch for “promotional arrangements that do more than merely acknowledge
the sponsor” such as specifications of an acknowledgement’s size, color or content, and
commitments to feature the sponsor’s products or services.91
This approach left any charity negotiating a sponsorship deal in grave uncertainty,
compared to the prior approach, but that did not trouble IRS officials. They felt that
charities that were “negotiating deals,” rather than simply thanking their benefactors,
defined the problem.92 Some early pronouncements about sponsorships took a very
sarcastic tone.93 Any charity that wanted to negotiate deals had already crossed over
the line between soliciting gifts and selling advertising services. Anything it did over
that line deserved no consideration.94

86. Streckfus, EO Office, supra note 69, at 787.
87. Id.
88. Russlyn Guritz & Charles Barrett, Corporate Sponsorship Income § 4, in INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TEXT FOR
FY 1993 § 5 (1992), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicf93.pdf (discussing the
Audit Guidelines as an attempt “to convey to the public the nature of the Service’s concerns,
and . . . alleviate public concerns about how the ruling affected them specifically”); Streckfus,
EO Office, supra note 69, at 787 (quoting James McGovern that “mere acknowledgment of a
donation would still be allowed but . . . the Service would, in cases that smelled of advertising,
‘apply a facts-and-circumstances test’”).
89. See Audit Guidelines, supra note 43, § 178.3; Guritz & Barrett, supra note 88, § 6
(Audit Guidelines are designed “to publicize those factors which the Service concludes make
these arrangements akin to advertising.”).
90. See Audit Guidelines, supra note 43, § 178.3(a).
91. See id. § 178.3(c).
92. See Guritz & Barrett, supra note 88, § 1 (quoting promotional blurb touting marketing
value of Fiesta Bowl sponsorship).
93. See Streckfus, EO Office, supra note 69, at 787 (quoting James McGovern as thanking a
candid John Hancock marketing consultant “for putting your John Hancock on that”).
94. See, e.g., IRS Casts Wider Audit Net; New Guidelines Portend Broadened Taxation, 5
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 436 (1992) [hereinafter Audit Net] (quoting Marcus Owens, Director,
IRS Exempt Organizations Technical Division) (“Our guidelines apply to organizations that
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The Audit Guidelines tried to achieve their second objective—calming small and
authentic charities—by reassuring them that the enforcement policy had not changed
and they were not targets. The title of the press release that announced the Audit
Guidelines was “EXEMPT ORGANIZATION DONOR RECOGNITION IS NOT
ADVERTISING.”95 The Audit Guidelines themselves began by stating that “mere
acknowledgement” of a donor would not compromise the exempt status of a
donation.96 They also specified that certain traditional forms of donor
acknowledgement were not advertising and stated that the guidelines would not apply
at all “[a]s a matter of audit tolerance” to small community groups.97
There were pragmatic reasons to ignore small groups: They were simply too small
to be worth auditing. The IRS, however, also seems to have assumed that most
traditional charities were not selling commercial sponsorships and would calm down if
assured that they and their practices were not targets.98 They would not mind the
indeterminate facts-and-circumstances approach because they were not selling
commercial sponsorships and could easily steer clear of bowl-game excesses. Their
business sponsors, if any, were neighborhood merchants who gave out of public spirit
and were acknowledged out of unforced gratitude.99
As discussed further below, the IRS quickly abandoned its initial view of the
problem. It soon realized that commercial sponsorships were not confined to “big
business” charities. More importantly, it discovered that commercial sponsorships were
not as clearly within the scope of the UBIT as preexisting doctrine suggested.
C. The Political Implications of Sponsorship and Advertising
The above subparts have introduced the conceptual distinction between advertising
and sponsor acknowledgement and contrasted it with the distinction between
commercial and gratuitous transactions. Before using these concepts to analyze the
sponsorship controversy, I will examine one additional preliminary implication of the
distinction between advertising and sponsorship: the differing meanings of advertising
and sponsor acknowledgement within the symbolic politics of the UBIT and the
charitable exemption.

have held themselves out as advertising vehicles. Essentially, if the sponsor’s logo is
everywhere, then it’s advertising.”); Spring 1992 Meeting, supra note 69, at 392 (statement of
Beth Purcell, Office of Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt Organizations)) (“‘We
don’t think this is even close. This is not traditional recognition of donor generosity. This is
basically event sponsorship marketing, a very up to date advertising technique . . . .’”).
95. I.R.S. News Release IR-92-4 (Jan. 17, 1992).
96. See Audit Guidelines, supra note 43, at introduction.
97. See id. § 178.1(2) (naming university professorships, scholarships, and buildings;
naming public broadcast and museum underwriters; listing contributors in event programs); id. §
178.2 (defining audit tolerance); supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
98. See Joanne Lipman, Companies’ Sponsorship of Events Is Threatened by IRS’s Ruling,
WALL. ST. J., Dec. 5, 1991, at B8 (quoting IRS spokesman who stressed that “[o]nly nonprofit
events that actively advertise their sponsors are at risk” from the Bowl TAMs).
99. See Streckfus & MacKinnon, supra note 47, at 411 (remarks of Marcus S. Owens,
Director, IRS Exempt Organizations Technical Division, contrasting bowl game sponsorship
contingent on television ratings with corporation whose name merely “appeared on a banner at
the end of a fun run”).
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Advertising and sponsorship acknowledgement are symbolically charged, in the
context of the charitable exemption. As discussed above, the exemption and the UBIT
are properly understood in terms of political symbolism.100 The UBIT steers charities
away from activities that clash with popular perceptions of charity and, thus, protects
the exemption, which serves as a symbolic expression of those perceptions. Viewed in
this context, the reason the UBIT applies to advertising is clear. Pure advertising is
exactly the kind of unrelated business activity the UBIT is designed to deter. It is
indistinguishable from normal for-profit business activities. A charity-owned billboard
is exactly the same business as a billboard owned by an individual or business
corporation. The billboard’s value depends entirely on exposure, not on the owner’s
mission or activities.101 Accordingly, pure advertising has the same potential to
undermine political support for the exemption as other unrelated business activities.
The origins of Section 513(c) of the Code illustrate the role of symbolic politics.
Major exempt magazine publishers—such as National Geographic, Nation’s Business,
Boy’s Life, and the Journal of the American Medical Association—were selling pages
of advertising. The marketing materials they sent to potential advertisers made it clear
that they were leasing billboards, not halos.102 Charity publishers also had tin ears for
the political implications of their actions. After the IRS promulgated regulations
applying the UBIT to advertising in 1967, they were so outraged by what they felt were
technically unauthorized regulations and so confident in their political power103 that
they pressured Congress to hold hearings. Their technical arguments did not impress
Congress. The obviously unrelated nature of their advertising businesses, however, did.
The hearings seem to have been lost as soon as the American Medical Association’s
(AMA) representative claimed that AMA journals’ advertising was all related to the
AMA’s exempt purpose. He found himself lamely defending plainly unrelated ads by
arguing to openly sarcastic Congressmen that soap “is an important therapeutic agent,”
“Coca Cola is used therapeutically,” and “soup is a nutritional item which certainly is
important in prescribing at times for certain types of patients.”104 Other exempt
organizations made hapless “destination of income” arguments, apparently unaware

100. See supra text accompanying note 19.
101. Clear Channel and Viacom, for instance, put their trademarks on billboards they own,
but advertisers do not pay for association with those brands. See, e.g., Clear Channel
Commc’ns, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 32 (Mar. 10, 2006), available at http://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/739708/000095013406004754/d33838e10vk.htm (“Generally, our
[billboard] advertising rates are based on the ‘gross rating points,’ or total number of
impressions delivered expressed as a percentage of a market population, of a display or group of
displays. The number of ‘impressions’ delivered by a display is measured by the number of
people passing the site during a defined period of time . . . .”).
102. See, e.g., National Geographic, Advertisement, Editorial Muscle, MADISON AVENUE,
Jan. 1967 (touting circulation size and growth and high renewal rate to attract advertisers).
103. The organizations involved were not political lightweights. The National Chamber of
Commerce, National Geographic, and the Boy Scouts of America were among the most
prominent. Opposing them was a group of well organized, but small and dreary, trade
publishers.
104. See Hearings on the Tax Reform Act of 1969 Before the House Comm. On Ways and
Means, 91st Cong. 1331 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Hearings] (statement of Bernard D. Hirsh,
American Medical Association).
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that the UBIT had defeated that doctrine twenty years earlier.105 Many organizations
followed the example of their predecessors in 1950.106 They could see that a general
exemption for commercial advertising income was politically untenable, and argued for
provisions crafted to minimize the tax on their own income.107
The clear political logic of taxing advertising does not apply well, however, to
sponsor acknowledgements. Initially, the argument seems clear. Assertions by
Congress and the IRS that “mere” acknowledgements of a sponsor have no commercial
value are fantasy. Those active in nonprofit fundraising and business sponsorship
admit, in candid moments, that most businesses and many individuals who seek
sponsor acknowledgements place significant value on them and pay for that value.108
Nor is the value provided too intangible to value. Professional athletes and entertainers
pay tax on the revenue they receive from their sponsors. The value they provide their
sponsors is no more tangible than that provided by a tax-exempt organization. We
simply assume that the amount a sponsor is willing to pay the athlete or entertainer,
after arm’s-length negotiation, is good evidence of the value of the intangible benefit
provided in exchange for that payment.

105. The charitable tax exemption applies only to organizations organized and operated
“exclusively” for exempt purposes. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Prior to passage of the UBIT in
1950, a number of courts had held that the exclusivity requirement applied to the manner in
which an organization used its funds (the “destination” of its income), rather than the activities
it engaged in to raise funds (the “source” of the income). See Stone, supra note 5, at 1485. The
UBIT overruled this doctrine. See id. at 1485–87.
106. See Stone, supra note 5, at 1543–44 (discussing the failure of charities to defend the
application of exemption to unrelated business income).
107. These exceptions ranged from the relatively principled attempt to exempt advertising
that was screened to have some relation to the organization’s exempt purpose, to the Boy
Scouts’ suggestion that only organizations chartered by Congress (i.e., the Boy Scouts) should
be exempt. See, e.g., 1969 Hearings, supra note 104, at 1071-73 (statement of John M. Lumley,
National Education Association); id. at 1224 (statement of John C. Fontaine, Boy Scouts of
America).
108. See Becker-Olsen & Simmons, supra note 64; Colombo, supra note 78; Crimmins &
Horn, supra note 62, at 11; Knauer, Paradox, supra note 65, at 60–81; Mara Janis, The Halo
Effect, ADWEEK, May 22, 2000, at 88; Meryl Paula Gardner & Philip Joel Shuman,
Sponsorship: An Important Component of the Promotions Mix, J. OF ADVERTISING, VOL. 16,
1987, at 11; Stipp & Schiavone, supra note 65, at 22. In commenting on the Audit Guidelines,
John Hyde, of the Dallas Methodist Hospitals Foundation, estimated with respect to eighty
percent of potential sponsors that
[t]heir employees and directors regularly remind one another of their fiduciary
responsibilities to the corporation and its owners. Volunteers and employees of
non-profit organizations must persuade the corporation’s employees and directors
that supporting their organization is in the corporation’s best interest. Their
strongest means of persuasion exist in providing positive exposure for the
corporation. Generally speaking, marketing, advertising, and public affairs
departments have the largest budgets for corporate sponsorships and contributions.
When a marketing staff person receives little justification (little or no promotion or
exposure) the answer to a charitable request is no.
John Hyde, Comments of Dallas Methodist Hospitals Foundation, 5 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV.
935, 935 (1992).
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On careful consideration, however, sponsor acknowledgements begin to look very
different from advertising in two ways that impact on the political symbolism at the
root of the exemption—expression of support for charitable activities.109 First, many
sponsor acknowledgements are not commercial in nature. Second, even commercial
acknowledgements, by their very nature, are efforts to mimic genuine support for
popular charitable endeavors.
The first way in which commercial sponsorships differ from pure advertisements is
pragmatic: Some acknowledgements are sold in commercial sponsorship transactions,
but many are simply an expected part of a gratuitous gift.110 Bona fide charitable
donations followed by public acknowledgements could not be more different from the
purchase of advertising within the context of the exemption. These acknowledgements
reflect the same symbolic support for charitable activities that supports the exemption.
We would therefore expect any attempt to deter them by imposing the UBIT to run into
political trouble.
The above argument applies only to acknowledgements of gratuitous gifts, but the
line between transfers motivated by the promise of an acknowledgement and ones
made in mere expectation of an acknowledgement can easily blur. A blurry rule that
turns largely on subjective goals and motives poses a serious evidentiary problem.
Practical application is likely to turn on objective facts that raise presumptions about
motivation. Viewed in this light, it is easier to understand the IRS’s early rulings,
presuming sponsor acknowledgements had no value.

109. A related but incorrect argument is that sponsorship income is “related” to an exempt
purpose, within the meaning of the UBIT. The sponsor’s motive in sponsoring a charity is
related to the charity’s exempt purpose. The business of selling sponsorship rights, however, is
not itself an exempt-purpose activity in the way selling medical or educational services is. See
Hill, supra note 4, at 29–31. If a nonprofit organization was formed for the exclusive purpose of
marketing sponsorship rights, it would not be exempt, even if it only serviced charities. Exempt
organizations also argued, prior to the passage of 513(i), that sponsorship fees were actually
royalties on a trademark license, which would be exempt from UBIT. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(2).
This is a plausible description of certain arrangements. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77
T.C.M. (CCH) 1569 (1999) (holding that affinity credit card income was exempt from the
UBIT). It is tempting to think that the royalty exception in Section 512(b)(2) itself reflects the
political preference for sponsorships discussed in this subsection. The actual history of the
exception, however, indicates that Congress intended to exempt mineral rights and royalties
from university patents, not trademark licensing royalties. See Revenue Revisions, 1947–48:
Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 80th Cong. 3463–65 (1948) (statement of
A.W. Peterson, University of Wisconsin, discussing Wisconsin Alumni Research Fund); H. REP.
NO. 81-2319, at 110 (1950) (specifically mentioning “overriding royalties,” a term used
principally in the financing of mineral extraction); “Recommended Changes in the Tax
Treatment of Educational and Charitable Organizations” at 6 (hand-dated Apr. 25, 1949)
(unsigned, but probably drafted by Laurence Woodworth of the Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation staff) (on file at National Archives at College Park, Maryland (NACP),
Record Group 56, Department of the Treasury, Entry 682, Office of Tax Policy, Subject Files,
1913-72, HA8 Exempt Organizations, Box 34.2, File EA-1/49.01 – Treasury-Joint Committee
Staff: Revenue Program for 1949-50) (assuming royalties would arise from “a patent, process or
natural resource”).
110. See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text.
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Before sponsorship became a major form of marketing, genuine charitable intent
was probably a more significant (often overwhelming) motivation for most
acknowledged donations. There was also no ready market for acknowledgements that
could be used to value them. Given the probability that donors were not buying
acknowledgements and the difficulty of valuing them, a rule deeming them valueless
made good practical sense. Some transactions might be improper, but the government
could expect much trouble and little benefit from trying to find and challenge those
transactions. This calculation is probably still true in the context of individual
donations.
By the late 1980s, however, it became apparent to the IRS that the first, pragmatic
distinction between sponsor acknowledgements and advertisements was no longer a
good justification for ignoring business sponsorships of charities. Certain charities
were unambiguously selling sponsor acknowledgements at high prices. The IRS’s
initial reaction was to abandon its earlier presumption.
The second difference between sponsor acknowledgements and pure advertisements
quickly became clear to the IRS when it abandoned its initial, pragmatic, approach.
The IRS found that business sponsorships implicate the exemption’s symbolic politics
in a different manner. To understand the connection between purely instrumental
sponsorships and genuine support for an exempt purpose, it is worth recalling that the
principal value of a sponsorship—the halo effect—depends on creating a strong
association between the sponsor and the sponsored event or organization. Mere
association is not enough, however. An association will generate a halo effect only if
the target audience also perceives that the association reflects genuine support.111 The
result is that the political symbolism of successful business sponsorships of charity is
very close to that of the genuine donations they simulate.
To illustrate this point, imagine a church donor who has no subjective enthusiasm
for the church. She nonetheless makes a large donation to include her name on a
“Defenders of the Faith” list posted in the foyer. Why? She calculates that other people
are genuinely enthusiastic about the church and that she might benefit from some of
that enthusiasm. Perhaps she is targeting potential customers who will be more likely to
shop at her store if she appears God-fearing.112 Perhaps she aims to influence potential
jurors in her upcoming criminal trial.113 Perhaps she just wants to fit in socially with
genuine church supporters. The point is that her calculation, albeit purely instrumental,
is entirely dependent on genuine enthusiasm. She is instrumentally mimicking the
uncalculated actions of a genuine enthusiast. Her actions will differ from those of a
genuine church enthusiast only if she errs in her calculations. She will also be careful
not to disabuse anyone of the notion that she is genuinely enthusiastic, since that would
destroy the value of the transaction.

111. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Pat Beall, Investigators Probe ‘Angel’ Of Orchestra, WALL ST. J., May 8,
1996, at F1 (discussing the role of a religious image in inducing trust in a fraudulent investment
advisor).
113. See, e.g., Ronald L. Levy, Sponsorship: What’s in It for You?, PUB. RELS. Q., Fall 2004,
at 42, 42 (2004) (describing the “benefit of public gratitude that protects an entire company—
management, employees and stockholders—when a company is eventually accused of corporate
wrongdoing, falsely or perhaps not so falsely”); Russell Hubbard, Scrushy’s Charitable
Donations Continue as Trial Approaches, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 18, 2003, at 1C.

2007]

TAXATION OF CHARITABLE SPONSORSHIPS

239

If purely instrumental purchases of charitable acknowledgement reflect, albeit
indirectly, genuine public enthusiasm for charitable purposes, we should expect
politicians to view them as close equivalents to gratuitous donations. We might then
expect attempts to deter them by imposing the UBIT to be problematic. In fact, purely
instrumental support for charity may be preferable to genuine support in the context of
the charitable exemption’s symbolic politics. Whereas genuine donations may reflect
highly idiosyncratic enthusiasms, instrumental support is more likely to flow to
activities that fit the most popular perceptions of good works.
Understanding the political forces that disfavor advertising but favor sponsorship
takes us another step towards understanding Section 513(i). It explains why both the
IRS and Congress have shown such an aversion to taxing obviously commercial
sponsorship transactions. Sponsor acknowledgement, like advertising, is charged with
political symbolism. That symbolism, however, strongly favors sponsor
acknowledgement. We now have the necessary conceptual basis to reexamine the
sponsorship controversy as a clash between the nominal policies embodied in
exemption doctrine and the political symbolism that actually underlies the exemption.
The triumph of the latter is not a story of IRS cowardice or corruption. Rather, it is the
story of an agency realizing that symbolic laws cannot be enforced according to
doctrinal logic alone.
III. REEXAMINING THE SPONSORSHIP CONTROVERSY
In this Part, I will use the conceptual framework developed in Part II above to
reexamine the sponsorship controversy. The IRS’s reaction to charities’ objections was
not the unprincipled concession to political power that critics have assumed. Rather,
the IRS realized that its initial attempt to deal with sponsorship revenues through the
distinction between commercial and gratuitous transactions, while doctrinally correct,
was practically and politically impossible. It then shifted to addressing the problem by
trying to distinguish between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement. The IRS
eventually realized (if only intuitively) that the real question in applying the UBIT to
sponsor acknowledgements is not whether the charity is selling something, but whether
its activities look like the kind of activities we like to think we are subsidizing through
the charitable tax exemption.
Accordingly, the 1993 Regulations were a deliberate attempt to give teeth to the
distinction between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement. They were structured to
deal with the ambiguous distinction between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement
by giving charities strong incentives to stay far away from ambiguous arrangements.
The IRS never backed down from this position, but Congress did. While the 1993
Regulations were designed to keep charities far away from advertising, Section 513(i)
is designed to allow them as close as possible. Nonetheless, Section 513(i) did not
exempt advertising revenues from the UBIT. Rather, it adopted the 1993 Regulations’
distinction between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement, albeit in largely
symbolic form. Although this distinction had no basis in preexisting UBIT doctrine and
disfavored charities, it compellingly expressed the governing symbolism.
A. Symbolic Politics and Law Enforcement
Murray Edelman has described normal administrative enforcement as a kind of
game that government enforcers and citizens play within the framework of legal rules
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whose symbolic validity is accepted by all players. No one expects or wants total and
literal enforcement. The players develop a mutual understanding of enforcement
tolerance. In the normal situation, however, those who violate the law do not question
the symbolic values it expresses.114 Thieves generally buy into the idea that thievery
should be caught and punished, even as they try to evade detection and punishment.
They are gaming the property system, not rebelling against it. When enforcers proceed
against them in accordance with the accepted “rules of the game” (e.g., customary
detection, charging, and plea bargaining practices), they generally do not question the
legitimacy of the proceedings against them, much as they might resent the result.115
Under Edelman’s analysis, government officials enforcing a law with symbolic
importance can run into political trouble for two kinds of over-enforcement. On the
simplest level, they can mistake the “rules of the game” and enforce too much. Insiders
in the enforcement game would regard strict and literal enforcement of the law as
inappropriate “sweating the small stuff.” Thus, a police officer who fines every traffic
infraction in violation of community understandings can run into political trouble for
enforcing the law.116 Such an officer would not be told to revise her interpretation of
the law, but to “get with the program” in her enforcement habits.
A more difficult problem arises when an enforcer acts on an interpretation allowed
(or even unequivocally required) by the relevant legal text that contradicts general
understandings of the law’s symbolic meaning. An insider would not criticize this
behavior as too picky, but rather as a fundamental perversion of the law. Those who
argue that the First Amendment should not ban Ten Commandments monuments from
public buildings, for instance, are generally not protesting their opponents’ picayune
enforcement or linguistic mistakes. Rather, they begin their Constitutional construction
with the conviction that a proper reading of the Constitution could not result in a ban
on wholesome and popular religious expression.117
B. IRS Reaction to Criticism of the Bowl TAMs Revisited
The IRS’s position in the Bowl TAMs implicated both kinds of over-enforcement:
first, the IRS appeared to have broken the rules of the “enforcement game” by suddenly
reversing its previous rulings. This problem was immediately obvious and the IRS’s
initial reaction was an attempt to convince charities that it was the “big business”
charities, not the IRS, that had violated the rules by disguising commercial transactions

114. See MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 44–72 (1964).
115. Criminals do not always accept the customary rules of the game as legitimate, but that is
not the same as questioning the symbolic validity of the law being enforced. For instance,
people who do not question the validity of traffic laws may nonetheless bitterly resent a
disproportionate enforcement policy based on the driver’s race.
116. See EDELMAN, supra note 114, at 45; WAFF 48 News, For many across the Valley,
Rogersville is known as a speed trap (Mar. 13, 2006), http://www.waff.com/Global/
story.asp?S=4527180 (reporting allegations of a Rogersville, Alabama police officer that he was
instructed to ticket only out-of-town drivers).
117. See, e.g., Silliness in Commandments Debate, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Feb.
27, 2006, at B7 (describing the opposition to public displays of the Ten Commandments as a
“ridiculous . . . effort by some malcontents to force any religious expression out of the public
square”).
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as gifts. Second, and more subtlely, the IRS’s enforcement of legal doctrine, while
doctrinally consistent, was incompatible with the symbolic meaning of the exemption
and the UBIT. The IRS treated sponsorship acknowledgements as advertising because
it failed to understand that sponsorship arrangements reflect altruistic public support
for exempt activities, despite the fact that most sponsors are commercially motivated
when they pay to tap into that public support. Accordingly, neither charities nor
politicians saw sponsorship support for charities as the kind of incongruous activity
that the UBIT should deter. The 1993 Regulations and Section 513(i) addressed this
second problem by abandoning the distinction between gratuitous and commercial
sponsorships.
1. Initial Reaction: Bowl TAMs and Audit Guidelines
Going into the controversy, the IRS did think it was engaging in over-enforcement.
A simple “thank you” would not transform a genuine gift into an unrelated business
transaction. “Big business” charities, however, had gone well beyond simple thanks.
They were engaging in quid pro quo sales of marketing services. Section 513(c)
seemed to express the relevant policy as to such sales. Commercialism in the nonprofit
sector seemed so obviously inappropriate that the IRS assumed that legitimate charities
were not engaging in it and would join the IRS in condemning any charities that were.
Consequently, the Bowl TAMs assumed that the appropriate test was whether the
transactions were commercial or gratuitous. As discussed, the IRS did not initially vary
from this approach, even after the controversy began. It simply assumed it had been
misunderstood.118 The IRS did not think it was repudiating its prior rulings. Rather, it
argued that “the benefits provided in this case are significantly different from the types
of donor recognition previously recognized by the Service as insignificant.”119
Despite the rhetoric of continuity, however, the issue was deeper than novel facts.
As discussed above, the IRS’s earlier rulings had seemed to apply a conclusive
presumption that public recognition could not transform a donation into a commercial
exchange.120 The Bowl TAMs reflected the IRS’s perception that it was facing a new
phenomenon. The old presumption that sponsor acknowledgements and advertisings
were distinct no longer seemed safe. Business donors and charities alike were
emphasizing the instrumental value of sponsor acknowledgements.
The IRS was correct in thinking that it was facing a changed landscape. What it
failed to see, at the beginning, was that the change had been occurring for some time
and was nearly complete. The IRS rendered its early rulings at the beginning of a
general business trend toward treating sponsorship as a marketing strategy. The trend
started in the 1970s but accelerated greatly in the 1980s.121 Its most important

118. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
119. See Cotton Bowl TAM, supra note 39, at *6.
120. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
121. See Gardner & Shuman, supra note 108, at 11 (comparing twenty-seven percent annual
growth in sponsorship spending between 1980 and 1985 to twelve percent growth in advertising
spending); Meenaghan 1991, supra note 62, at 5 (noting increase in worldwide sponsorship
spending from $2 billion in 1984 to $4.1 billion in 1987); Sandler & Shani, supra note 62, at 9
(reporting five hundred percent increase in sports sponsorships between 1982 and 1987);
William L. Shanklin & John R. Kuzma, Buying That Sporting Image: What Senior Executives
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application was in for-profit professional sports sponsorships, but the same change in
business attitudes affected nonprofit sponsorships equally. The reason for the change is
unclear. Commentators who focus on charitable sponsorships have often surmised that
Reagan-era budget cuts forced charities to be more entrepreneurial.122 Other factors are
probably more important, however, since the same trend occurred simultaneously and
on a much larger scale in for-profit sports. Marketing scholars have generally cited the
increased cost of broadcast media, marketers’ growing acceptance of sponsorships as a
marketing tool as they became more familiar with it, and the effects of increased
“clutter” and “ad zapping” on the effectiveness of advertising.123
Whatever the cause, the change was dramatic. Businesses and sponsored
organizations had long viewed sponsorships as donations. They justified their
sponsorships vaguely as attempts to improve their public image. In practice, however,
business sponsorships often reflected the genuine (but not business-related) interests
and sympathies of high executives. It is easy to see why the IRS was not interested in
trying to distinguish between pure philanthropic motives and the largely pretextual
commercialism of these early sponsorships.
By the 1980s, companies were removing their sponsorship programs from their
charity and public relations budgets and placing them into their marketing budgets,
where expenditures were evaluated more coldly for commercial value.124 The result
was sponsorship agreements that were more specific about their marketing objectives
and marketers boasting about their achievements.125 Both caught the IRS’s attention in
the late 1980s, highlighting the differences between the vague self-interest of
traditional sponsorship and the specific return-on-investment claims in the new market
for sponsorships. In a February 1992 meeting of the D.C. Bar, one IRS official
“analogized charities’ efforts at attracting corporate sponsors to a billboard that read,

Need to Know About Corporate Sports Sponsorship, MARKETING MGMT., Spring 1992, at 59, 59
(comparing $3 billion in estimated 1992 U.S. sponsorship spending to $500 million in estimated
1982 spending).
122. See, e.g., 1993 Hearing Transcript, supra note 56, at 5–7 (statement of Mike Berry,
International Festivals Association); Farbman, supra note 6, at 64–65; Streckfus, EO Office,
supra note 69, at 787 (quoting James J. McGovern, the IRS Associate Chief Counsel (Employee
Benefits and Exempt Organizations)).
123. See Gardner & Shuman, supra note 108, at 12; Meenaghan 1991, supra note 62, at 5;
Shanklin & Kuzma, supra note 121, at 59.
124. See, e.g., Meenaghan 1991, supra note 62, at 6; Shanklin & Kuzma, supra note 121, at
60, 64. The transformation has not been complete. A recent survey, for instance, found that
forty-two percent of responding sponsors made no efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of their
sponsorships. See Marketers Weigh in on Sponsorship ROI, INCENTIVE, Aug. 2006, at 12
(reporting IEG survey).
125. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 69 (“‘Philanthropy and patron-of-the-sport days are
gone,’ says Jack Mahoney, [John Hancock’s] sports marketing consultant. ‘We wanted the
recognition.’”). The measurement of sponsorship value by exposure time is still popular. See,
e.g., Barrand, supra note 62, at 17 (quoting an advertising agency executive, noting that “[t]here
will always be people who equate sponsorship to a media buy because it makes it easier to
understand”); Joyce Julius & Associates, Team Sponsorships & Partnerships, A SECOND LOOK,
June 2006, http://www.joycejulius.com/Newsletters/a_second_look__june_2006.htm.
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‘This space for rent.’”126 Other IRS officials emphasized the importance to their
internal deliberations of a Harvard Business School case study127 and Wall Street
Journal article,128 each of which praised John Hancock’s decision to sponsor a bowl
game as a very efficient ad buy.129
By the time the IRS focused on “big business” charity sponsorships, the shift was
well advanced. A wide gap had opened between the IRS’s and the charities’
perceptions of the rules of the enforcement game. The stage was set for a crisis. Each
side was primed to become outraged at the other’s treatment of the same conduct. This
explains why the Audit Guidelines fell far short of their aims of warning charities away
from commercial sponsorships and reassuring them that the rules had not changed for
their usual activities.130 A broad cross-section of charities already considered
commercial sponsorships to be a normal and unproblematic activity.
2. Reconsideration: 1993 Regulations
As negative comments poured in from a wide variety of charities,131 the IRS began
to understand two elements of the new landscape. First, corporate sponsorships were
already pervasive and pervasively important in the nonprofit sector.132 Second,
business sponsors were largely, if not exclusively, motivated by sponsorships’
commercial value.133 Because exempt organizations knew that corporate sponsors paid
them largely for valuable services, they correctly perceived that most sponsorship
arrangements involved the commercialism the IRS was targeting. The IRS thought it
was sending its auditors to pick a few bad apples out of the barrel. It quickly

126. Paul Streckfus, Three Recent Gatherings Discuss Corporate Sponsorship Guidelines, 5
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 196, 197 (1992) (quoting Marcus Owens, Director, IRS Exempt
Organizations Technical Division).
127. See GREYSER & TEOPACO, supra note 69.
128. See McCarthy, supra note 69.
129. See Spring 1992 Meeting, supra note 69, at 391–92 (remarks of Beth Purcell, Office of
Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt Organizations)); Streckfus, EO Office, supra
note 69, at 787 (quoting James McGovern, IRS Associate Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits
and Exempt Organizations)).
130. For a discussion of these aims, see supra notes 88–99 and accompanying text.
131. Streckfus, Gift, supra note 48, at 179.
132. See Audit Net, supra note 94 (reporting widespread concern); Marlis L. Carson, Report
on the Tenth Annual Nonprofit Organizations Institute, Sponsored by the University of Texas
School of Law, Held on January 28 & 29, 1993, Reports Compiled by Marlis L. Carson:
Service’s Beth Purcell Discusses Evolution of Corporate Sponsorship Regulations, 7 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 363, 363 (1993) [hereinafter Carson 1993] (“The Service soon discovered a
problem with this reasoning because the practice of using corporate logos is widespread and not
just restricted to bowl games, Purcell explained.”); Bertrand M. Harding, Jr., Owens Gives Some
Comfort to Public Broadcasters on Corporate Sponsorship Income, 6 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV.
400, 400 (1992) (reporting statement by Marcus Owens, Director, IRS Exempt Organizations
Technical Division, that the IRS “does not have a good understanding of how the corporate
underwriting system [for public broadcasters] operates”); Lipman, supra note 98, at B8 (quoting
Lesa Ukman, editor of Special Events Report, who stated, “I don’t think the IRS has a clue of
the ramifications of all of this.”).
133. See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 108.
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discovered that it was sending them out with shotguns and instructions to shoot the
biggest fish in a crowded barrel. Little fish were understandably nervous.
The pervasiveness of nongratuitous sponsorships, in and of itself, posed a serious
problem for the IRS. It is important to note, however, that this problem was not
necessarily politically insurmountable. Where there is little disagreement about the
symbolic meaning of a law, it can be sporadically enforced (subject to conventions of
enforcement tolerance) with little or no political trouble. Income tax enforcement is a
good example. Tax evasion and avoidance is fairly pervasive, but few insiders in the
enforcement game would argue that this invalidates the income tax. Most accept that
selective enforcement, even random enforcement, is valid. If the problem had been of
this sort, an effort to convince charities that the IRS was not exceeding normal
enforcement tolerances would probably have worked politically, even if violations
were rampant. Politicians would have been suitably scandalized by the charities’
commercialism, and the offending charities would have sheepishly promised full
cooperation with the new “regulatory environment.”134
By late summer 1992, however, the IRS was realizing that it had a deeper problem.
The Audit Guidelines had increased, rather than quieted, protests by charities. In
Congress, the IRS’s attempt to isolate obvious abusers from the majority of legitimate
charities actually seemed to strengthen the targets’ case for persecution. In the fall of
1992, the IRS’s enforcement initiative seemed to be backfiring. It appeared that the
IRS’s initiative would miss its original targets completely and hit only charities it
meant to leave alone.135 The IRS had started with the idea of targeting the advertising
income of a few commercialized pseudo-charities, but the Audit Guidelines comments
and hearings had clarified that its efforts would impact “authentic” charities, not just
“big business” charities. Meanwhile, Congress was passing legislation that was so
tailored to the interests of college bowl games, the NCAA, and the Olympics that it
excluded many other charities. Internally, the staff apparently began to question its
initial assumption that cracking down on commercially motivated sponsorship
arrangements was either practical or normatively desirable.
At the same time that the IRS began to realize how difficult a situation it was in, it
began to see a way out. In commenting on the Audit Guidelines, public broadcasters
pointed out that the FCC had been dealing with commercialism in sponsorship
acknowledgements for fifteen years in its licensing rules for public television and radio
stations.136 The FCC had confronted the issue early, since its rules required

134. See, e.g., U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial
Professionals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Gov’t
Affairs, 108th Cong. 325 (2003) (submission by Deutsche Bank AG) (“Deutsche Bank
continuously monitors changes in the law and the regulatory environment and adapts its
business practices, policies and procedures to comply with the ever-changing legal and
regulatory environment. Deutsche Bank is cognizant of the Internal Revenue Service’s highly
publicized tax shelter initiatives and is committed to complying with all applicable rules related
to tax shelter registration and disclosure.”).
135. See James J. McGovern, Service’s McGovern Explains Proposed Corporate
Sponsorship Regulations, 7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 381, 381–82 (1993).
136. See FCC Rules, supra note 33; Juliann Avakian-Martin, IRS Faces Tough Crowd at
Hearing on Corporate Sponsorship Guidelines, 6 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 370, 370–71 (1992)
(reporting questioning by Marcus Owens, Director, IRS Exempt Organizations Technical
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broadcasters to identify their sponsors in the name of openness. The FCC’s rules for
nonprofit broadcasters (“FCC Rules”) therefore allowed sponsor identification but
prohibited promotion of a sponsor’s products and services. The FCC’s approach,
though itself not without controversy, had several practical advantages. It was
established and had been endorsed by Congress.137 It had proven workable for public
broadcasters. Finally, public broadcasters would support it, since they were already
living with it and did not want two inconsistent regulatory regimes.
The public broadcasters brought up the FCC Rules as a special pleading, not a
general solution. They argued that any acknowledgement that comported with the FCC
Rules should suffice for UBIT purposes, because the FCC forced them to acknowledge
sponsors and Congress had expressly blessed “enhanced underwriting” sponsor
acknowledgements.138 At the Audit Guidelines hearings, however, the IRS and
representatives of other charities were already considering a broader use of the FCC
approach.139 A few months later, the IRS issued the 1993 Regulations, adopting the
FCC’s distinction between acknowledgement and promotion. Carefully chosen
examples reassured college sports, street festivals, performing arts organizations, and
other key critics of the IRS’s original approach that they had little to fear.140 The
shooting war was over.
Critics quickly labeled the 1993 Regulations an unprincipled capitulation to
political pressure.141 The charge was unfair, but understandable. The critics noticed
that the IRS had abandoned the distinction between commercial and gratuitous
transactions. Existing doctrine seemed to require this distinction. A rule that would
exempt the most egregious violators seemed, therefore, to be a craven retreat from
enforcing the law.

Division, regarding appropriateness and provisions of FCC rules); Carson 1993, supra note 132,
at 363 (explaining IRS decision to substitute FCC approach for earlier approach after comments
and public hearings); Harding, supra note 132, at 400 (reporting July 1992 comments of Marcus
Owens to public broadcasters, stating that IRS exempt organizations’ officials were not familiar
with the FCC rules and planned to meet with FCC officials to familiarize themselves).
137. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 399A–399B (2006).
138. For example, National Public Radio’s comments on the Audit Guidelines stated that:
[p]ublic broadcasting is expressly authorized by federal statute to raise revenue
through ‘enhanced underwriting’ and the regulatory structure of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) assures that such enhanced underwriting
credits are not promotional announcements. Thus, public broadcasting
underwriting acknowledgments falling within the accepted limits of the FCC’s
rules are activities fully related to the exempt purposes of the public broadcaster
and do not constitute advertising.
Comments of National Public Radio, 6 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 558, 559 (1992).
139. The Exempt Organization Tax Review led its account of the hearings with a statement
by Marcus Owens, Director, IRS Exempt Organizations Technical Division, that the IRS would
give “special consideration” to applying the FCC approach to all charities. See Avakian-Martin,
supra note 136, at 370.
140. See 1993 Regulations, supra note 52, at 5,690, § 1.513-4(g), Examples 1 (charity
marathon), 2 (art museum exhibit), 3 (charity sports tournaments), 4 (bowl game), 5 (little
league team), 6 (art festival), 7 (public radio), 8 (symphony orchestra).
141. See Knauer, Influence, supra note 4, at 1031; Sheppard, supra note 4; Streckfus, Gift,
supra note 48.
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The IRS understood (if only intuitively) what its critics missed: Enforcement
agencies are granted enforcement discretion not only to prioritize limited public
resources, but also to assure that literal enforcement does not go beyond the symbolic
legitimacy of the rules they are enforcing. The IRS did not abandon enforcing the
UBIT’s limits on the charitable exemption; it abandoned a doctrine that, taken literally,
led beyond the UBIT’s symbolic reach. It called off literal enforcement of existing
doctrine, but only in favor of a new rule designed to place real limits on charities’
activities. The tainting rule denied automatic tax-exempt treatment to any arrangement
that combined elements of both advertising and sponsorship.142
When the IRS proposed the 1993 Regulations, it explained that it was attempting to
fix a “clear line” that both the IRS and charities would find easier than the muddy
distinction between gratuitous and commercial transactions.143 Charities praised the
proposal on the same basis.144 It is hard to take these claims seriously. As discussed
above, the distinction between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement is at least as
ambiguous as the rule it displaced.145 The IRS implicitly recognized the ambiguity by
including the tainting rule, as did the charities by opposing it.
Under the tainting rule, the charities were hoist on their own petard. The IRS had
adopted the ambiguous distinction they favored, but had burdened them with most of
the risk of the ambiguity. A charity that sold advertising and acknowledged a
sponsorship could still try to bifurcate its services, but it had no assurance any of them
would be exempt. The rule gave charities a strong incentive to keep their sponsor
acknowledgements as pure as possible.
Accordingly, the charities argued against the tainting rule.146 Although they often
said they were looking for clarity, they were really seeking ambiguity. They were
content with the IRS’s admission that selling sponsor acknowledgement on an openly
quid pro quo basis was not an unrelated business per se. After that, all they needed was
the right to minimize and cabin any taxable revenue from services that crossed the
fuzzy line.147 The right to bifurcate revenue would put the IRS in such an unfavorable
position that a well-planned deal could be effectively bulletproof.

142. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
143. See Marlis L. Carson, Corporate Sponsorship Regs Provide ‘Clear Line’ for IRS,
Charities, Says Owens, 7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 917 (1993) (acknowledging that the 1993
Regulations “permit exposure that would ordinarily be considered advertising” in favor of a
“clear line”).
144. At the hearings on the regulations, for instance, Marilyn Mohrman-Gillis, representing
America’s Public Television Stations, praised them as “based on, and intended to . . . establish
clear bright light standards.” 1993 Hearing Transcript, supra note 56, at 11. John Samuelson,
representing the United States Olympic Committee, applauded them as an effort “to provide
clear and unambiguous guidance.” Id. at 24. Julie Noel Gilbert, representing the Exempt
Organization Committee of the ABA’s Section on Taxation, described them as a “new brightline standard.” Id. at 26.
145. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
146. For example, Henry Morris, Jr., of the American Heart Association, commented,
“Because the final regulations implemented by the IRS will explicitly define what constitutes
advertising and what constitutes acceptable tax-free acknowledgement, nonprofit organizations
and corporate sponsors can realistically differentiate between advertising and acknowledgements
in our written contract.” 1993 Hearing Transcript, supra note 56, at 4.
147. See, e.g., id. at 17–20 (statement of Pete Scott, Coopers & Lybrand).
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3. Resolution: Section 513(i)
As discussed above, however, the IRS refused to abandon its position. The charities
had to return to Congress for legislation that resolved the controversy in their favor.148
Although Section 513(i) appeared to follow the 1993 Regulations, it was actually an
end-run around them.149 It gave the charities the ambiguity they wanted: It eliminated
the tainting rule. It also replaced the 1993 Regulations’ functional test for advertising
with a short list of examples, leaving the treatment of any message outside those
examples highly ambiguous.
Does Section 513(i) then represent the capitulation the standard story describes?
Again, the standard story falls short and for the same reason. If Congress was simply
giving “big business” charity's lobbyists what they were seeking, why not return to the
express exemption of advertising revenue it had passed in 1992?150 That language was
reintroduced in a 1995 bill that died in committee.151 That same year, Congress passed
language that eventually became Section 513(i).152 It adopted the 1993 Regulations’
distinction between advertising and sponsorship and insisted on excepting periodical
advertisements, thus preserving the original purpose and function of Section 513(c).
A cynic would say that canny lobbyists and members of Congress left a hollow tax
on advertising to provide political cover for a sellout. I assume this is true, but it begs
the question. Why was political cover necessary, and how did a nominal tax on
advertising provide it? In thinking about this question, it is important to remember that
maintaining the appearance of taxing advertising is not costless to charities. Section
513(i)’s distinction between advertising and sponsorship imposes expensive
compliance costs on charities, even though it no longer promises the government any

148. See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text.
150. It is worth noting that I do not assume charities normally influence Congress or the IRS
in any improper way. IRS officials were rightly indignant at contemporary suggestions to the
contrary. See McGovern, supra note 135. James Q. Wilson has described the process by which
agencies charged with administering a statute in which a single, organized group has a vested
interest tend to be influenced by that group. The agency finds it hard to avoid that group’s point
of view because that group is likely to be the most significant (often the only) source of
information. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 79 (1989). The same observation is only
slightly less applicable to Congress itself. As one contemporary observer put it, “You get
episodic or anecdotal information in front of the Congress, and standing alone, without looking
at the big picture, you’re left with this notion of the big, bad IRS beating up on this little, teeny,
sweet organization . . . .” Fred Stokeld, EO Reps Like Corporate Sponsorship Provision—For
the Most Part, 17 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 382, 383 (1997). As Edelman noted, an agency whose
mission is to serve the public generally, but whose actions practically impact on an organized
interest group, is likely to end up serving the interests of that interest group, but only in ways
that maintain a symbolic dedication to the broader mission. See EDELMAN, supra note 114, at
44–72. Again, the same is largely true of Congress and perfectly predicts Section 513(i).
151. See H.R. 1161, 104th Cong. (1995).
152. That bill was vetoed for reasons unrelated to sponsorships. See Devroy & Pianin, supra
note 58.
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significant revenue or restraint on commercialism.153 In 2004, for instance, the Nokia
Sugar Bowl reported $21,500 out of approximately $800,000 in sponsorship revenue
as unrelated business income.154 The Capital One Bowl reported no unrelated business
income, but reported spending $124,693 in professional fees, at least some of which
presumably went to assuring that its sponsorship arrangements were not taxable.155
Both organizations probably would prefer the vetoed 1992 law under which all their
sponsorship revenue was simply exempt. This point was not lost on the charities’
representatives.156
C. Reinterpreting the Shift from Taxing Commercialism to Taxing Advertising
If the shift to distinguishing between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement was
not a capitulation, what was it? I propose that the actions of the IRS and Congress are
much easier to understand if we view the problem in terms of political symbolism. The
IRS, the charities, and Congress liked the distinction between advertising and sponsor
acknowledgement because it fit the symbolic role of the UBIT in deterring activities
that undermine the exemption.157 It shifted the question to what it should be within the
political symbolism of the UBIT: not whether the charity is selling something, but
whether its activities look like the kind of activities we like to think we are subsidizing
through the charitable tax exemption. As discussed above, commercial sponsor
acknowledgements are nothing like advertising from this perspective.158 Advertising is
exactly the kind of activity the UBIT is designed to deter. A commercially successful
charity sponsorship, by contrast, is one that makes us feel the sponsor genuinely
supports the charity’s exempt activities. It is favored by the politics of the exemption.
The IRS had misperceived both the pervasiveness and the political meaning of
commercial sponsorships when it began the controversy. Once it caught on, however,
the IRS’s reaction was so politically astute that it completely supplanted earlier and
cruder legislative attempts to serve the narrow interests of the IRS’s targets. Section
513(i) is a gutted version of the 1993 Regulations. It is almost purely symbolic
legislation. The charities, however, applauded the symbolism and Congress kept it,
despite its obvious costs. The important lesson is that the symbolic function of the
UBIT is still politically potent. This lesson has been lost not only on critics of the 1993

153. It also places outer limits on the services a charity can offer tax-free. I assume
compliance looms larger than any actual economic effect, since Section 513(i) allows charities
to allocate payments, and sponsors do not mainly want pure advertising services from charities.
In fact, I assume that charities had some such calculation in mind when they supported the 1993
Regulations (but opposed the tainting rule) and later welcomed Section 513(i).
154. See Sugar Bowl, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, Form 990, Part VII
Line 93 & Stmt. 13 (2004), available at http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2005/720/272/
2005-720272830-021e789d-9.pdf. It presumably had sufficient expenses to offset this income
and owed no tax
155. See Capital One Bowl Form 990, supra note 27, at Stmt. 2.
156. See Edited Transcript of the July 31, 1998 ABA Exempt Organizations Committee
Meeting, 22 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 75, 97–99 (1998) (comments of Celia Roady).
157. For a discussion of the function of the UBIT, see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 109–113 and accompanying text.
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Regulations and Section 513(i). As will be discussed below, the charities also missed it
and may have obtained an unstable victory as a result.
IV. CONSTRUCTING THE LEGAL RULE TO DISTINGUISH
ADVERTISING FROM SPONSORSHIP
As discussed above, the functional continuum between advertising and sponsorship
generates a corresponding political continuum in the context of the exemption and the
UBIT. Part IV considers the implications of this continuum for designing a legal rule to
distinguish advertising from sponsorship and uses it to understand Section 513(i). In
Subpart A, I set out the conceptual test suggested by the continuum for distinguishing
taxable advertising revenue from exempt sponsorship revenue: predominance of effect.
I then discuss practical considerations that militate against this conceptual test as an
operative legal rule. In Subpart B, I reconsider Section 513(i) in this light and
demonstrate that it is inherently unstable because it continuously tempts charities into
politically dangerous activities. In Subpart C, I consider the possibility of a workable
safe-harbor rule.
A. A Conceptual Rule and Practical Complications
At the extremes on the continuum between advertising and sponsorship, it is easy to
apply the charitable exemption and the UBIT. Selling advertising pages in National
Geographic, although theoretically within the exemption’s policy of subsidizing
charity, is taxed under the UBIT because of its undesirable symbolism. Conversely,
selling a pure sponsor acknowledgement, although theoretically within the UBIT’s rule
of deterring unrelated business activities, is not taxed under the UBIT because it poses
no symbolic problems. A pure sponsor acknowledgement reflects strong and genuine,
if indirect, support for the sponsored organization’s exempt activities. Real business
sponsorships are rarely so easy. They fall in a blurred zone between advertising and
sponsor acknowledgements where conflicting political inclinations meet.159
A legal rule to deal with the mixed cases presented by the real world could use one
of four approaches. The first approach is a piecemeal test: if elements of advertising
and sponsor acknowledgement mix, allocate the payment between them and apply the
UBIT to the advertising portion. This is the approach adopted in Section 513(i).
Ironically, it was also the approach initially adopted by the IRS (before it realized that
it was dealing with a highly ambiguous conceptual distinction). The second approach is
an in terrorem rule: If any advertising is present, apply the UBIT to the entire

159. For instance, when Maryland Public Television fired Louis Rukeyser from his
longstanding position as host of Wall $treet Week, Rukeyser quickly arranged to air an identical
program on CNBC, which would then make the program available for rebroadcast on public
television stations at nominal cost. Rukeyser brought most of the sponsors of the PBS program
with him to CNBC, and CNBC was willing to air the sponsor acknowledgements in a format
that would meet the FCC and IRS rules for public television. See Philip Kennicott, ‘Wall
Street’s’ Shortcut Back Home, WASH. POST, July 12, 2002, at C7. Apparently, a purely
commercial broadcaster was satisfied with the prices sponsors were willing to pay for
“acknowledgements.”
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arrangement.160 This is the approach adopted in the 1993 Regulations. The third
approach is a predominance test: If elements of advertising and sponsor
acknowledgement mix, allocate the payment between them and apply the UBIT to the
advertising portion. It should be noted that the threshold for “predominance” in such a
rule could mean anything from slightly more important to overwhelmingly
predominant. The fourth approach is a safe harbor: If elements of advertising and
sponsor acknowledgement mix, exempt the entire arrangement from the UBIT, if it
meets certain clear but arbitrary tests that tend to indicate the predominance of
sponsorship over advertising.
It should be noted that each of these approaches deals in different ways with the
ambiguity of distinguishing between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement. The
first and third ignore the ambiguity. The legal treatment of a given arrangement
depends on a precise application of an inherently imprecise test. The resulting rule is
difficult to apply, requiring the careful consideration of as many facts as are available.
It is also largely unpredictable in many cases. As noted above, this explains why
charities lobbied for Section 513(i), but not a predominance test.161 By placing the
burden of an ambiguous and fact-intensive case on the IRS, while cabining the cost of
any taxpayer loss, Section 513(i) puts nearly all the risks of ambiguity on the IRS. This
deters enforcement in all but the most egregious cases.
The second and fourth approaches both try to avoid the ambiguity of the underlying
distinction. The in terrorem rule does this by making the consequences of ambiguous
facts so drastic that planners will shy away from ambiguous arrangements. This
strategy helps the government by shooing taxpayers away from creating ambiguous
facts. It does not, however, benefit the taxpayer. Not surprisingly, the IRS was
comfortable with the 1993 Regulations and the charities were staunchly opposed. The
charities did not want to confine themselves to unambiguous sponsor
acknowledgements and saw no reason they should have to do so. In the end, Congress
was sympathetic for the same reason the charities were unabashed: One pole of the
advertising-sponsorship continuum pulls harder. Politicians are eager to support
popular charities.162 Politicians are also eager to pummel charities that embarrass them
by engaging in uncharitylike business.163 When forced to choose, however, they like
supporting popular organizations more than they like pummeling commercial
nonprofits.164
When sponsorship and advertising mix, the advertising involved will rarely be
easily separable from the sponsorship. Rather, the advertising is often designed to
emphasize or otherwise exploit the sponsor’s association with the sponsored
organization or event. Both the sponsor and the charity have a strong incentive to
assure that sponsorships, including any associated advertising, convey a strong
impression of genuine support. Sponsors’ efforts to convince their target audiences to

160. I am not assuming that all sponsor acknowledgements would be taxable under the
UBIT, but that some would be arguably taxable in the absence of special treatment.
161. See supra notes 146–147 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 108–113 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 19, 100–107 and accompanying text.
164. As noted supra note 6, this was essentially the NCAA’s response to recent
Congressional inquiries into the basis for granting a tax exemption to popular college sports:
We are exempt because we are popular with members of Congress and their constituents.
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confer the halo of charity can also convince the charities’ target audiences (e.g.,
Congress). The success of sponsorships in conveying the desired impression tends to
tip the political balance toward sponsorship in mixed cases until the elements of
sponsorship are negligible and the arrangement approaches pure advertising.
The fourth approach—a safe-harbor rule—was never suggested during the debate.
A well-designed safe harbor grants taxpayers certainty as to a range of transactions that
are, in any case, likely to receive favorable treatment under a facts-and-circumstances
analysis. Safe harbors are common in tax legislation and regulation.165 They benefit
both taxpayers and the government. Taxpayers gain because they can plan with
certainty. The government gains because it has lower enforcement costs: The cases it
gives up (questionable transactions within the safe harbor) are best abandoned, since
they would be marginal and expensive to pursue. Meanwhile, overall enforcement
becomes easier as most taxpayers cluster within the safe harbor, allowing the IRS to
concentrate on a smaller number of more egregious violators.166
It is not clear how the charities would have responded if the IRS had proposed a
true safe harbor, rather than an in terrorem rule, in the 1993 Regulations. It is possible
that such a rule would have offered enough benefits to charities that they would have
accepted significant restraints. I will discuss the possible practicality of such a rule
below. For now, however, it is enough to observe that the charities’ response was
entirely understandable, given the rule the IRS proposed. In essence, the IRS proposed
to take away all ambiguous cases (and many unambiguous ones) with no corresponding
benefit of certainty. The charities responded by reclaiming all ambiguous cases with
almost no corresponding danger of uncertainty.
This analysis leads to one other observation about Section 513(i): It is not a pure
piecemeal approach. While it leaves the distinction between advertising and sponsor
acknowledgement largely to the imagination, it also contains a list of examples that are
deemed unambiguous advertising.167 This adds what I will call a “dangerous-harbor”
rule.168 As the name suggests, a dangerous-harbor rule is the opposite of a safe harbor.
It establishes certainty of violation as to a range of transactions that are, in any case,
likely violations under a facts-and-circumstances analysis. In the case of Section
513(i), the kinds of blatant sales promotion messages described in the examples would
likely fail a facts-and-circumstances test for “mere acknowledgement.” Where the
sponsored organization delivers the sponsor’s overt sales message, the halo effect of

165. To give an example, shareholders may treat distributions in partial liquidation of the
incorporated business as capital gains, not dividends. See I.R.C. § 302(b)(4). A distribution
qualifies as a partial liquidation, however, only if it is “not essentially equivalent to a dividend.”
See id. § 302(e)(1). The Code then adds a safe harbor to this indeterminate standard. Section
302(e)(2) provides that a distribution is included in (e)(1) if it “is attributable to the distributing
corporation’s ceasing to conduct, or consists of the assets of, a qualified trade or business” and
the distributing corporation continues a “qualified trade or business” after the distribution. For
another example, see Rev. Proc. 77-37 § 3.01, 1977-2 C.B. 568 (listing minimum numerical
requirements for advance rulings under I.R.C. § 368).
166. Returning to the example of I.R.C. § 302(e)(2), the safe harbor cedes little revenue. The
vast majority of cases covered by it would satisfy the facts and circumstances test. It is valuable
to taxpayers, however, to know that a common set of facts will be safely within the rule.
167. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
168. My thanks to Dan Klerman for coining this phrase.
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association is likely to be purely secondary to the billboard effect of conveying an
overt sales message.
For all that Section 513(i) is a dangerous harbor in form, however, its harbor is not
very dangerous. Without the tainting rule, if a charity puts a toe over the line, only the
toe is at risk (and, practically speaking, only if it is a big enough toe to justify
significant enforcement costs). Still, like the retained tax on advertising, the dangerous
harbor list of messages deemed to constitute advertising is not costless to charities. Its
presence in Section 513(i) is therefore further evidence that the symbolic politics of the
UBIT were still alive in 1997.
B. Dangerous Safety: The Inherent Political Instability of Section 513(i)
As discussed above, Section 513(i)’s dangerous-harbor tax on advertising provides
evidence that the political forces underlying the UBIT are not dead. For the moment,
however, those forces are quiescent. Section 513(i) makes only the barest of symbolic
nods in their direction. Its apparent safety for charities is deceptive, however. By
reducing the taxation of advertising revenue to a symbolic veneer, Section 513(i) may
face future political instability.
It stands to reason that sponsors will pay more for commercial messages if there are
fewer restrictions on their nature and format.169 Sponsors want to rent halos, but they
are willing to pay extra for the use of any available billboards for their promotional
messages. The practices (and occasional statements) of exempt organizations bear this
out.170 The result is pressure on exempt organizations to crowd the line demarcating the
dangerous harbor. Adding to the temptation, Section 513(i) is designed to limit the
financial consequences of straying across the line.171 While Section 513(i) limits the
financial risk of this tendency, it does not limit the political risk.
If the principal political purpose of the UBIT is to direct exempt organizations away
from defined politically problematic activities, a rule that invites organizations to
crowd the dangerous harbor line is politically perilous. Because Section 513(i)’s
dangerous harbor rule tempts exempt organizations to push the outer limits of the
public’s perception of charity, it invites a political reaction. A traditional safe-harbor
rule would produce the same tendency to crowd the line, but the line would not be
politically dangerous. The taxpayer who strays out of a safe harbor is usually still safe
(and politically acceptable). The taxpayer who strays into a dangerous harbor is in
automatic trouble. Since Section 513(i) constantly tempts charities to sell sponsorships
as close as possible to the dangerous-harbor line, it presents the constant risk that a
large number of charities (or a few high-profile ones) will concurrently cross the line.

169. It does not necessarily follow, however, that they will not pay enough for a restricted
format to satisfy even a commercial broadcaster. See supra note 159.
170. For example, PBS used focus groups to determine if viewers would tolerate the addition
of corporate mascots to sponsor acknowledgement spots in children’s shows, presumably
because sponsors were willing to pay more if they could get their mascots on television. It
turned out that viewers were willing to accept stationary mascots but felt that animated ones
were incompatible with the noncommercial brand image of public television. See Karen
Everhart, Corporate Mascots (Still as Rocks) and Celebs to Appear in Sponsor Credits,
CURRENT, July 8, 2002, available at http://www.current.org/cm/cm0212pbs.html.
171. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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Such a noticeable foray into the nearly pure advertising might spark the kind of
political reaction that created the UBIT in 1950 and expanded its scope in 1969.
It is sometimes observed that Congress has amended the UBIT a number of times
since 1950 to protect one or another unrelated business in which charities wanted to
engage.172 The intended conclusion is that the UBIT is a political dead letter; charities
have the political power to counter any real attempt to enforce it. The conclusion is
tempting, but shortsighted. It is something like observing that a volcanic island erodes
steadily into the sea and concluding that it can only get smaller. Erosion is an easily
observed, daily occurrence. The last volcanic eruption may have happened before
living memory. Ignoring the eruptions, however, leads to a flawed understanding of the
island and its probable future. It is important to understand the intermittent but
powerful force that raised it above sea level in the first place. If that force is still active,
a single eruption tomorrow could replace thousands of years of erosion. As discussed
above, Section 513(i) seems to demonstrate that the symbolic political force that
produced the UBIT in 1950 and expanded it in 1969 may be dormant, but is not
extinct.173 It is therefore dangerous to assume that it will never again become
significant.174
The timing and nature of the political reaction (if it ever comes) are difficult to
predict. Section 513(i) tempts charities into practices that raise persistent, low-level
dissent, but there is no current sign of serious political trouble.175 The forces of

172. See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 135, at 382 (“We could have sat back and let corporate
sponsorship become the latest addition to the piecemeal repeal of UBIT.”); Stokeld, supra note
150, at 383. Arthur Andersen seemed to be making a similar point in a 1992 lobbying
memorandum to the IRS staff. The memorandum dwells on previous IRS attempts to apply the
UBIT to bingo games and booth rentals at trade shows, both of which ended when Congress
passed amendments to the UBIT to exempt the specific revenues in question. See Memorandum
from Rachelle Bernstein, Arthur Andersen & Co., to Terrill A. Hyde, Tax Legislation Counsel,
Dep’t of the Treasury (Feb. 6, 1992), available at Arthur Andersen Advocates Clarification of
College Bowl Income Rules, 5 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 445 (1992). The memorandum
characterizes these amendments as evidence that the UBIT does not apply to any activity the
IRS cannot show to be in actual competition with a taxable business. Given that neither of the
cited amendments added such a requirement, the real message was presumably that the IRS’s
efforts were futile, because the charities had enough clout in Congress to get a special UBIT
exception for their sponsorship revenues.
173. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 did not merely add Section 513(c) to the Code. It also
expanded the tax on debt-financed income and extended the UBIT to cover churches and other
tax-exempt organizations. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172 §§ 121(a)(1)–(3),
(d)(1), (3)(A)–(B), 83 Stat. 487, 543–548.
174. The recent criticism of commercialism in college sports, discussed supra note 6, is good
evidence that the forces that created the UBIT are still with us. The mere fact that pundits and
politicians alike find the rhetoric attractive is significant, whatever one thinks about the chance
it will result in real change.
175. See, e.g., Sarah McBride, Mixed Messages: As Sponsorship Sales Blossom, Public
Radio Walks a Fine Line, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2006, at A1 (citing listener complaints that
public radio has been commercialized and commercial radio operator complaints of unfair
competition for advertising revenues). See also the discussion supra note 6 of recent ferment in
the media and Congress over college sports. For the moment, it does not appear that this
criticism represents the kind of political momentum necessary to overcome the popularity of
college sports (much less charities in general), but it is hard to predict the outcome.
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political inertia and entrenched interest politics are strong. An event of sufficient force
to jar loose their grip on exemption policy may never come. Presumably it would take
a scandal or some other precipitating event to convert scattered discomfort into
legislative action. Section 513(i) seems safe for the foreseeable future, but the future is
notoriously unforeseeable.176
The event that precipitated Section 513(c) in 1969 was, ironically, the charities’
insistence that Congress hold hearings. Ignoring the politics of the UBIT, they were
confident that they could best the taxmen and the trade journal publishers with a
combination of technicality and political clout. They miscalculated the politics,
technicalities fell away, and the hearings became a rout. That particular scenario will
probably never repeat itself (in the 1990s, charities sought legislative relief without
hearings), but lawmakers call their own hearings when events make them sufficiently
uneasy.177 The political potential for such a turning point is ever-present and Section
513(i) tempts charities into the behavior that might precipitate it.
C. The Possibility of a Safe Harbor
If the status quo is shaken, the event that shakes it will determine the most likely
response. If history is any guide, if charities act in ways that do not meet politicians’
views of charity, politicians will react by banning the specific actions that bother
them.178 To give a simple hypothetical, imagine a network of public radio stations that
succeeded in growing to the point that it was noticeably competing with struggling forprofit networks.179 Its competitors and potential competitors might react by trying to
rile up public anger at the so-called nonprofit, living off of both rich ad revenues and
hard-earned tax dollars. A head of political steam could easily build if enough
politicians were either pressured by public opinion, persuaded with campaign
contributions, or simply attracted to the theme (out of personal ideology or a
calculation of constituent ideology). Since those stoking the controversy would have a
narrow goal (shutting down a competitor), the resulting legislation would probably be
restricted to radio stations (or even particular radio stations).
In the absence of a clear understanding of the problem’s source, such a fly-swatting
response is almost inevitable. It is not, however, the only possible or best response. A
more stable solution would be to substitute a true safe-harbor rule that would allow

176. “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.” Yogi Berra. It is possible
that the anger over the extraordinary pay packages recently granted to a few high-profile college
sports coaches could provide the impetus for Congress to act. See, e.g., Richard Wolf, Athletic
Spending Under Fire in Senate, USA TODAY, Jan. 5, 2007, at 9C.
177. See, e.g., Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good
Charities: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. (2004); Thomas W. Joo,
Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s, 82 IND. L.J.
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=885203&
high=%20thomas%20joo (abstract) (describing symbolic role of Congressional hearings on
insider trading). As noted, supra note 6, Senator Grassley has been calling for hearings on the
tax exemption of college sports.
178. See Stone, supra note 5 (describing the 1950 UBIT and 1969 amendments as such
responses).
179. See, e.g., McBride, supra note 175.
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politically popular sponsorships to proceed on commercial terms while staying well
clear of pure advertising. The purpose of this Subpart is to lay down the design
principles and sketch out a few possible contours of such a safe harbor.
In addressing this question, it is important to reemphasize that Section 513(i) in its
current form is consistent with the basic politics of the exemption and the UBIT. The
problem with exempting revenues from commercial sponsorships is not, as some have
indicated, that it is indefensible as a matter of basic UBIT policy or even that it may
leave questionable revenues exempt.180 As discussed above, Section 513(i) represents a
political decision to give the benefit of the doubt to certain sponsorships because
political preferences for protecting sponsorship outweigh political distaste for charities
engaging in unrelated business activities.181 The problem is that Section 513(i) is
unstable and might thus eventually need amendment or substitution. It seems unlikely,
however, that any substitute would or should abandon the major hallmark of Section
513(i)—the recognition that pure sponsorship acknowledgement can be exempt from
the UBIT even if it is part of an overtly commercial transaction. Rather, a realistic
substitute should aim at constraining the natural drift into advertising more effectively.
Is a more stable safe-harbor rule possible within the above parameters? We should
first consider the rule proposed by the IRS in the 1993 Regulations, based on the
FCC’s rules. The problem with this attempt was the very aspect that made it acceptable
to sophisticated charities. The distinction between “merely” acknowledging the
sponsor and its products and services, on the one hand, and promoting them, on the
other hand, is no less ambiguous than the distinction between advertising and
sponsorship. The IRS sought to protect itself from fighting over difficult cases by
scaring charities away from them with the tainting rule. This in terrorem strategy is
justifiably less attractive to taxpayers and therefore more politically risky than a safeharbor strategy. A true safe harbor keeps planners within acceptable bounds by
promising safety, not by threatening danger.
Accordingly, the key to designing a more realistic safe-harbor rule is to accept that,
in granting taxpayers a realm of clear safety, it will necessarily and somewhat
arbitrarily abandon some meritorious claims. The need to benefit both the government
and the taxpayer leads to two opposing requirements for an effective safe-harbor rule.
First, most conduct within the bright line should be clearly “safe” even under a factsand-circumstances analysis. This requirement assures that the government does not
give up too much to secure certainty and convenience of application. In a sponsorship
rule, sponsorship should clearly predominate over advertising in most arrangements
within the bright line. Second, the bright line should include most of the conduct that
good faith taxpayers think is (or should be) “safe” under the facts-and-circumstances
test. This requirement assures that planners will find enough opportunities within the
rule to make the certainty it offers tempting. In a sponsorship rule, a good portion of
mainstream sponsorship practice must be included.
The first requirement involves devising rules that exempt little conduct that would
otherwise be taxable. The conceptual distinction between advertising and
acknowledgement suggests some useful rules that would not trouble a business chiefly
interested in a charitable halo, but would be unacceptable to a business mainly

180. For commentators taking this position, see supra note 4.
181. See supra notes 162–163 and accompanying text.
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interested in renting a billboard. A combination of such rules could produce a fairly
good proxy for arrangements in which sponsorship clearly predominates. Some
examples follow.
None of these examples should be taken as a necessary element of an effective safe
harbor. Nor am I suggesting that a good rule would include all of them. To the
contrary, combining all of these restrictions would create a rule that was far too
restrictive, sacrificing too much of the certainty and convenience of application needed
to attract taxpayers into the harbor, in exchange for too little added political safety. My
examples are only intended to show that fairly clear lines could be drawn to discourage
advertisers without imposing impractical constraints on bona fide sponsors.182 Each
example is arbitrary and can only be justified based on the probability that it will
exclude mostly advertising and include mostly sponsorship. The examples are as
follows:
•

•

•

Exclude any transactions in which payment was contingent on the number of people
exposed to the message. For instance, a sponsorship payment that ratcheted up by
$10,000 for each additional hundred thousand television viewers would not be
183
safe. This targets the purest advertising deals by making it hard to link payment
to exposure.
Require that the sponsored organization’s name and logo be at least as prominent
as the sponsor’s name and logo in any message. For instance, the Capital One Bowl
184
would not be safe unless it was renamed the “Capital One Citrus Bowl.” This
precludes pure advertising. It also tends to identify messages in which sponsor
acknowledgement is important.
Exclude arrangements that involve displays of the sponsor’s products. For instance,
a bowl game would not be safe in accepting a car company sponsorship conditioned
on the right to place its cars at the stadium entrance. Admittedly, such a rule might
inconvenience bona fide sponsors who want to attach a halo to a particular product.
It would arguably inconvenience many more advertisers.

182. A number of these rules correspond to facts and circumstances highlighted in the Audit
Guidelines. The difference between this suggestion and the Audit Guidelines is that the Audit
Guidelines list was intended to highlight potentially significant facts for a facts-andcircumstances determination. This had the intentional effect of increasing uncertainty for any
transaction with a whiff of advertising about it, leaving charities guessing as to which facts or
groups of facts might be determinative. See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text. My
proposal is for a safe-harbor rule, which aims to increase certainty (without giving up too many
good cases) by making a certain set of strategically chosen facts arbitrarily determinative.
183. Section 513(i) already imposes this rule. See I.R.C. § 513(i)(2)(B)(i).
184. Some prominent bowl games already do this. The game presented by The Orange Bowl
Committee, Inc., for instance, is currently named the FedEx Orange Bowl. See The Orange
Bowl Committee, Inc., Home Page, http://www.orangebowl.org (last visited Aug. 22, 2006).
The Rose Bowl does not sell naming rights, merely indicating its primary sponsors prominently.
See, e.g., PASADENA TOURNAMENT OF ROSES ASS’N, ROSE BOWL GAME: GAME DAY GUIDE
(2006), available at http://www.tournamentofroses.com/rosebowlgame/2006_GameDayGuide.
pdf.
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Exclude messages describing the sponsor’s products or services except as
185
necessary to identify the sponsor’s main class of products or services. For
instance, describing Capital One as “a leading credit card issuer” would be
acceptable, but describing it as “issuer of the new Prime Lock card, guaranteeing
you prime rate on all your balances” would not. This would not prevent a sponsor
from associating its brand and products with the sponsored organization or event,
but would preclude many sales promotion messages.
Exclude messages that include “production elements,” such as music and pictures
(other than a depiction of the sponsor’s and the exempt organization’s respective
names and logos). For instance, showing the Ford logo at the beginning of an hour
of public television would be safe, but thirty seconds of footage showing a Ford
Taurus cruising across beautiful landscapes would not. This rule, again, might
cramp some bona fide sponsor’s options, but would not preclude association with
the sponsored event or organization (especially if “leveraged” with separate
186
advertising). It would pose a serious challenge, however, to advertisers who
generally want to convey more elaborate messages. Pure advertisers do not want to
“leverage” an ineffective ad buy with another ad buy.
Exclude sponsorship by particular products or services, as opposed to a business
organization’s name. This rule would, again, inconvenience some legitimate
sponsorships (and discriminate arbitrarily between sponsors whose name is also
their brand and those who have separate brands), but it would restrain a large class
of thinly-disguised sales promotion messages (e.g., “brought to you by [MOVIE
TITLE], the new hit romantic comedy starring [STARS’ NAMES], now playing at a
theater near you”).

Could such rules meet the second requirement of clearly safeguarding a significant
amount of current sponsorship practices? As discussed above, from the charities’
perspective, no safe harbor could be preferable to current law. The premise of this
discussion, however, is that Section 513(i) is vulnerable to upset by an event that
changes the political balance. The crucial question, then, is not whether Congress is
likely to replace Section 513(i) with a safe harbor under current political conditions,
but rather whether a safe harbor could be attractive if Section 513(i) became untenable.
Put differently, would any safe-harbor rule exclude so much current nonabusive
conduct that it would fail its basic purpose of adding a meaningful amount of certainty?
The cynical reader may feel that the answer to this question is obvious. One look at
the commercialism in recent bowl game sponsorships may seem proof enough that any
safe harbor that confined itself to messages in which the acknowledgement element
predominated would exclude so much politically and economically significant conduct
to doom itself politically. This reaction bears further consideration.

185. An example of this kind of restriction is the so-called identifying statement by which
issuers of securities can announce a pending issuance without being deemed to be “conditioning
the market” for the issuance. Among other things, such a statement can include “[a] brief
indication of the general type of business of the issuer.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a)(3).
186. As discussed supra note 72 and accompanying text, such leveraging is common among
sponsors.
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The safe harbor elements proposed above would probably have little effect on most
bowl game sponsorships.187 Some readers may feel that, if true, this is a flaw in the
proposal. This feeling probably stems from some combination of discomfort with
exempting quid pro quo payments as “donations” and discomfort with describing
certain exempt activities (such as college football) as “charity.” As discussed above,
discomfort with favoring commercial sponsor acknowledgements has much less
political validity than the doctrine on which it is based might suggest.188 Discomfort
with the scope of the exemption, by contrast, is a matter of taste.189 Those who feel it,
however, should understand that the UBIT’s principal political function is to foreclose
such fundamental thinking about who gets the charitable exemption subsidy and why. It
seems unlikely that Congress or many charities would want to open such a discussion.
Accordingly, a rule that allows sponsors to share in the popular glow of college sports
cannot be dismissed as an inappropriate result under existing law.
The main group of exempt organizations toeing the line of the current dangerous
harbor seems to be those whose exempt activities involve the production of traditional
advertising media, principally public broadcasters and operators of popular nonprofit
websites.190 Clearly these organizations could live within a more restrictive safe-harbor
rule (or take risks in leaving the safe harbor), but might receive considerably less
revenue. The political question, if it arises, will be how important advertising revenue
is to these organizations and how important these organizations are to Congress, given
whatever circumstances precipitate change. This balance cannot be predicted; the
position of exempt organizations will change over time, and the political context of any
reform proposal cannot itself be predicted.
For the reasons discussed above, I cannot give a complete blueprint for the future
reform of Section 513(i). Nor do I advocate such reform as a matter of substantive
policy.191 My purpose is merely to point the way toward a more stable version of the
current solution. If, as seems possible, Section 513(i) becomes unstable in the future, it
might help guide policymakers away from the reactive legislation that has
characterized the UBIT since 1950.

187. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text (describing acknowledgement of Capital
One at Capital One Bowl). The one significant exception to this is the “equal billing” constraint
which would preclude exclusive naming rights.
188. See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 6.
190. Periodical publishers are in a similar substantive position, but are treated specially
under the UBIT. As discussed supra notes 102–107 and accompanying text, Congress added
Section 513(c) to the Code in 1969 specifically to tax advertising in exempt periodicals.
Congress and the IRS recognized this special history by excluding print periodicals from
Section 513(i) and, earlier, the 1993 Regulations. See I.R.C. § 513(i)(2)(B)(ii); 1993
Regulations, supra note 52, at 5,690, §1.513-4(a).
191. In other words, I do not think advertising income raises any social issues that other
types of exempt income do not. Nor do I think the revenue at stake is so significant as to compel
action. I do think a true safe harbor would be superior to Section 513(i), but only because it
would be more stable politically.
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CONCLUSION
The treatment of charitable sponsorships under the UBIT has often been held up as
a glaring example of a shameful retreat by the IRS from the disinterested and
principled application of the tax law and a prime example of interest-group tax
legislation by Congress. There is no denying that Section 513(i) bears the marks of
lobbyists. Focusing on that fact, however, obscures the complexity of the issue and of
the political response to it. It assumes that the IRS’s initial position on the issue was the
right one, simply because charities opposed it out of self-interest. It also assumes that
commercial sponsorship arrangements and advertising are equivalent under the UBIT
and that the self-interest of charities is consequently the only interest at stake.
In this article, I have challenged those assumptions and tried to show why the
distinction between advertising and sponsorship is important to understanding the
problem, the solution we have reached, and the potential instability of that solution.
Unlike participants in the controversy and past commentators, my analysis does not
end with parsing technical elements of the UBIT. Rather, it examines the economic
realities and political intuitions that eventually lead to Section 513(i).
At the core of the problem is the distinction between advertising and sponsor
acknowledgement. Since the early 1980s, marketers have understood that buying a
“halo effect”—the right to associate one’s brand with the goodwill of a popular
organization or event (sponsorship) is both commercially valuable and fundamentally
different from buying the “billboard effect” of simple visibility (advertising). They
have also understood the natural tendency of these two different services to mix into an
interrelated whole.
In the context of the exemption and the UBIT, this distinction is politically crucial.
Charitable sponsorship is a close analogue to genuine charitable donation and is
therefore closely aligned with the political impulse behind the charitable exemption’s
blanket subsidy of exempt activities. Advertising, like other unrelated business
activities, does not match the perception of the kind of activities subsidized and is
therefore well within the political impulse that discourages such activities by taxation
under the UBIT.
Tax policymakers and commentators have long felt but not understood this
distinction. Traditionally, they have tended to focus on the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial transactions to distinguish between arrangements that
looked like donations and arrangements that looked like an unrelated business. As
marketers began to view sponsorships in commercial terms during the 1980s, however,
the unreality of this distinction, as applied to business sponsorships, became apparent.
This flawed understanding of the problem presented by sponsorships drove the
fluctuating actions of the IRS and Congress from 1991 to 1997. The IRS’s initial
instinct that it should tax all commercial sponsorships immediately brought out a
reality the IRS had missed—that most business sponsorships were commercially
driven, but that the symbolic politics of the exemption favored them, even as it
disfavored advertising sales by charities. Accordingly, the IRS quickly shifted to
proposing regulations based on the distinction between advertising and sponsorship.
At the same time, Congress underwent the opposite transformation. It started from a
simple desire to appease college football and the Olympics and passed a narrow
exemption for their advertising revenues. After that bill was vetoed, however, later
bills, including eventually the 1997 law that enacted Section 513(i), followed the IRS’s
lead in maintaining the appearance of taxing advertising. Section 513(i) retains the
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symbolism of a tax on advertising, but not the reality. Charities eagerly pushing toward
the lucrative advertising end of the continuum between sponsorship and advertising did
not want a safe harbor that would allow them to conduct commercial sponsorships in
peace. They wanted an exemption for most advertising and they got it. The symbolism
of a tax on advertising income, however, was still important enough that Congress
retained it and the charities concurred, despite the cost and inconvenience to them.
The question raised by Section 513(i) is not whether it is technically in keeping with
the UBIT. That is the wrong question because the UBIT, at its core, is not about
technical revenue issues, but rather the political perceptions that support the charitable
exemption. Rather, the question is whether Section 513(i) will be politically stable in
the long term if it encourages charities to engage in business activities that do not
match those political perceptions. It was that disconnect between the perception and
reality of charities’ activities that brought about the UBIT in the first place, as well as
its expansion to tax advertising in 1969. Section 513(i) encourages charities into
activities that could trigger similar political forces. The exact political event that could
disturb the status quo is hard to anticipate, just as the rainstorm that dislodges a boulder
at the top of the hill cannot be predicted with certainty. The direction of the roll,
however, is predetermined.

